A SUMME OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY:

SUCCINCTLY GATHERED,
ELEGANTLY COMPOSED,
AND METHODICALLY
handled,

BY

THAT LEARNED SCHOLLER
AND VVORTHY DIVINE
WILLIAM PEMBLE,
Master of Arts, and late Commoner of *Mag. Hall.*

Mores honesta verbis, verba Moribus.

Γράπος ἔστω σοὶ τὸ λόγῳ πιστότερος, ἵνα μὴ μόνον λέγων ἀλλὰ καὶ σιωπῶν τὸ αἰδήσιμον ἔχῃς.

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To the Reader.

BEhold (impartiall and courteous) Reader, I preſent unto thee one whom I need not name, the whole booke ſo fully ſpeakes him, it being the Character of him, whoſe name the Frontiſpice beares: here hee yet liues although dead, for the Booke breathes that which hee once was, and when he was, hee liued that which the book teacheth, for ſuch was his admirable compoſure, that his very actions were a moral Lecture, having exactly learned that of Minutius, non loqui Magna ſed vivere. I will not make any elogie of the Author, nor encomion on the Book, when as the one deſerves rather the regiſtring in Annales, then the light torch of a running Pen; for the other unleſſe my gueſſe faile me, to a judicious braine, and a well ſeaſoned heart, it will commend it ſelfe, it having a mixture of learning and delight, whereby it will both inſtruct and pleaſe the Reader, and to ſay truth ſuch was his dexterity, that by Rhetoricke he could inſinuate to a perſwaſion, and by ſolidity of argument evince thee to aſſent. But if perhaps the book in all points anſwere not the worth of the Man, or thy expectation, let it not detract from his deſerts, or beget a prejudice in thy conceit, ſince the work is Poſthumus, and (I am perſwaded) never by the Authour intended for the publique cenſure; neither is the Printer much to be blamed, ſince hee is ſo carefull to preſerve any of thy bleſt reliques (Pemble) yet unſlaine, from the unhappy fate of the urne. Laſtly, ſince to offend is humanæ ſortis, whatſoever errors thou mayeſt find either in Author or Printer, the one thou mayeſt in thy judgement correct, the other in humanity condone. So mayeſt thou in ſome ſort vindicate the Authour, and gratifie the Printer. Farewell.


All disciplines are
1 Theoricall
1 Reall
1 Meta-physical.
1 Inspired as Divinity contained in the Bible.
2 Acquired of which write
Aristotle.
Avicenn.
2 Mathematicall
1 Arithmetick.
2 Geometry.
3 Musick.
4 Astronomy.
3 Physicall concerning
Principles
Generation
Of Naturall things.
2 Rationall
1 Grammer.
2 Rhetoricke.
3 Logick.
2 Practicall
1 Active
1 Oeconomicks.
2 Ethicks.
3 Politicks.
2 Factive as skill in
1 Navigation.
2 Hunting.
3 Husbandry.

A SVMME OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

I. *Ethickes.*

MOrality is the Art of behaviour, prescribing directions for manners arising out of use and customary conversation.

Manners are either { 1 Reall making a good man ἀγαθὸν. 2 Complementall, making a faire conditioned man καλὸν.

The Vertues arising out of both Καθηκοντα { 1 Time. 2 Place. 3 Person.

Goodnesse is Positive. Complement varies according to

The one necessary, the other indifferent, if used there is a grace and ornament, if not the impeach is not great.

Goodnesse is wrought by actions of Vertue.

Naturall for men to work: our life tearmed by the *Pythagorians* πρᾶξιν πρακτικὴν, a fardle of Actions: Beasts are dull and at command, *aguntur non agunt*: men onely are Active, as having { Wit for judging. Will for prosecuting.

Actions are to be perfected by { Vertue for directions. Fortune for successe.

Vertue is lame without Fortune, and Fortune blind, heady and headlesse without vertue.

Our working is either { 1 In a state Politicke. 2 In a family Oeconomicke. 3 In private touching our selves, only Ethicke.

In Ethicks are foure causes of Actions.

1 The Finall, the utmost is felicity, the speciall and immediate end, and particular good being in shew or substance good.

2 The Formall, as { Vertues / Vices } making our { *Bonum* { *Verum.* *Apparens.* }

Actions { Good. Bad.

3 Materiall, as Passions, whereon our vertues must worke.

4 Efficient, as { Wit that makes prudence. Will that makes præ-election.

This is your Subject of all Ethicks.

II. *Of particular Ends.*

NO Action so suddaine, but proposeth some end: As actions are sundry, so are particular ends: Our appetite affects them as either in shew or substance good.

Omnia appetunt Bonum.

Desire naturally is for preservation; Evill as it is evill is an enemie to being: Hence the aime of all Appetite must be some good.

Appetites are either
- 1 Naturall, as common Inclinations to a generall good of being: as for the Earth to beare downewards, the fire upwards,
- 2 Sensitive called *appetitus sensitivus*, whose issues are to wit
  - 1 Griefe for things to bee avoided.
  - 2 Pleasure for things to bee prosecuted.
- 3 Rationall, partly from the Understanding, that judges the good: partly from the will that affects it: this is in men only, the other in beasts.

Hence ariseth three sorts of Good, *viz.*
1. *Bonum Entis*: The object proper to the naturall.
2. *Bonum sensus*: Whose satisfaction is delight.
3. *Bonum Mentis*: Whose manager is Reason.

If Reason be governesse, we apprehend true good.

If lead by Passion, we follow appearances.

Passion sets a colour on Evill, and perswades the good of it.

Hence are all vicious desires.

Cic. 1. Divin. Our way for such objects is with *Annibal* to heare the gilded Pillars in *Iuno's* Temple, before we venter to feast on them.

——*Veri speciem dignoscere calle*
Ne quasub aurato mendosum limeat auro.

Things are desired, either as
- 1 Usefull onely to others, not for themselves, so riches in themselves are nothing, but are desired for use only.
- 2 Usefull both for others, and desirable in themselves: so Virtues of themselves are comely, and are as meanes to happinesse.
- 3 Desirable onely for themselves, not for others, as felicity the last good, τελος, *finis finium*.

That we often faile of the end intended, is for the want of either
1. Judgement in choice of the right meanes.
2. Ability in not prosecuting that we have chosen.
3. Constancy in not persevering in what we have chosen, and began to prosecute.

The excellency of one end above another is knowne.

1 If that end have the most worthy meanes directing to it. Hence the end of Policy is above others as having the meanes of other Practick ends subalternate to it.

2 If it comprehend the speciall end intended by actions of lesse worth, as the art of Horse-man-shippe is referred to art Military.

Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other.

Felicity is the best of ends: our soule affecteth it: Vertues worke it: Constancy in goodnesse perfects it: It selfe is the up-shot of all practick ends.

III. *Of*

III. *Of Vniversall Ends.*

Felicity.

FElicity is the propofall of the beſt good.

We propoſe our good either as informed by paſſion or judgement: Paſſion goes by opinió, and as opinion is ſtaggering, ſo muſt ſuch propoſals be. Hence to ſome pleaſure, to others wealth, to others honour, is Felicity; all are pleaſures for the time, but content not.

This felicity is not true, but forged.

True felicity is from an uprightneſſe of judgment.

That we may find it out, ſeeke we what in a man can be

Of { 1 Greateſt perfection. 2 Sole ſufficiencie. 3 Quietneſſe of minde.

1 Perfection is required to all goods, but the height of perfection to the beſt goods.

2 Sole ſufficiency that there bee { 1 Contentation in what we enjoy. 2 No want of what we enjoy not. } This keepes us from repining.

3 Quiet of minde that there bee { 1 Integrity towards God. 2 True dealing with men. 3 Not doting on the goods of { Body or fortune } { But uſing them alwaies as helps not as ends. 4 Stopping extravagancy of paſſions.

A breach in any of theſe marres tranquillity.

In a man we conſider a double carriage,

either as { 1 Living in this life only Moral. 2 Preparing himſelfe for a future life, Chriſtian.

Hence Stoicks and Platonicks held, we were free of two Cities { 1 The greater, —Heaven. 2 The leſſer, —The World.

This world as it beares the image of the heavenly, and is the way of our journying thither: So the actions of the one truely moral, are not in oppoſition to the Chriſtian

Each of theſe lives have in their end { 1 Greateſt perfection. 2 Sole ſufficiency. 3 Trueſt quietneſſe of minde.

The felicity of the one is preſence of all good, when the ſoule is ſeperated.

The meanes to get this generall is Religion.

The felicity of the other is preſence of all good, whilſt we live.

The meanes to get it, is common honeſty, or univerſall juſtice.

Living in this world our worke is either in { Soule onely. Soule and Body.

The worke of our ſoule onely is immanent.

The perfection of it is contemplation.

The object and aime of it is Truth.

The ſatisfaction is content and quietneſſe of minde.

The meanes to attaine it, is Sapience and Pondering.

That is an habit generall wrought by two particulars { 1 Vnderſtanding for conceit, and apprehenſion of principles. 2 Science for inference of concluſions.

This true felicity, ſith in it is { 1 True perfection. 2 Sole ſufficiency, 3. Quietneſſe of minde } is tearmed *Felicitas contemplativa.*

Our worke both in ſoule and body is tranſient, ſo called becauſe the action of the

the soule were secret, were it not that the spreading of the body displaied it: The operations of the soule properly are punctuall and indivisible: As they partake of the body, so they open themselves both to the view, and use of others: Hence arise actions of practise, their speciall aime is the good of others, and sith we are not for our selves only, but to be usefull to others, and society arises out of community of nature; our speciall felicity, for use must be practick.

Bona animæ felicitem.

Felicitas Practica.

There are two speciall Felicities then.

As sinne and vice being in all a double misery { 1 Darkenesse of understanding for discerning truth. 2 Depravation of will for affecting goodnesse.

So to remedy these, our perfection must be { Contemplative for the one. Practick for the other.

These come not of the strength of men, sith the blind cannot judge of colors, the perverse cannot will goodnesse.

They are given of God, if any gift comes from above to man, saith *Aristotle*; *Ἔοικεν ἡ εὐδαιμονία εἶναι δοτὸν θεοῖς* &c.

It is most fit it should be our felicity, *ἢ δοκεῖ μάλιστα, ἢ ἀπὸ θεοῦ τοῖς ἀν.*

The sterne to manage these must be faith.

Without it { Contemplation is curiosity. Good actions but fashion, and vaine-glory } { This is the aime of the heathen goodnesse.

With it { Contemplation is wisdome. Action is { 1 Duty to God. 2 Charity to our neighbour 3 Salvation to our selves. } } This alone is mans felicity.

IV. *Temporall happinesse described.*

Felicitas est actio.

THe perfection of things is in their operation: Idlenesse, and want of Action proceeding from Impotency: Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action.

To will and intend suffices not, but doing is requisite,

In masteries the crownes are not given to the likeliest in person, but to the best in performance. *Arist. Ethic. 1. c. 8.*

Action is a power common to all; communities commend not sith commendation aimes at a speciall, and preferring before others: Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a speciall action of man, that proceeds from the soule not as it is vegitative, and sensitive (so agreeing with Beasts and Plants) but as it is rationall, only proper to man.

Animi.

Secundum Virtutem.

In the reasonable soule wee { Governing. consider two parts, the one { Governed.

The governing part is by { Wit. Will regulating our soules actions, and stopping their unwarrantable excurrence: This called *Recta Ratio*, or *Virtus*.

The part to be governed is the seat of Passions.

Though they naturally sprout from the stemme of reason, and are proper to men onely, yet in themselves they are wild and unruly, but strength of reason must order them.

Our perfection { in the latter which must obey. is not { but in the former, which must governe.

In vita perfecta.

Reasons in strength and actions of Vertue are nothing, unlesse they are continued: Perfection of good must be without Ruptures: The intercedence of an after evill marres the glory of the precedent good actions: Hence felicity must

be

bee a worke of honestie to the end of our dayes.
This felicitie ends with our life, and therefore temporall.
The other begins after death, and is eternall.

V. *Things required to temporall Happinesse.*

HAppinesse is a Uertue common not for our selves onely, but for the good of others.

An happy mans imployment must be beneficence: his reward esteeme and credite among the people.

That hee may bee best in performance, and highest repute, he must have the goods of { Minde. Body. Fortune.

Tria bonorum genera requiruntur ad felicitatem.

The minde is most inward, so affordeth goods most proper to felicity; A man for morall goodnesse is to bee judged for the goods within: Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable. They are not overmuch to bee desired, yet if offered they are to be received; wee take them for conveniencie, not necessity, as usefull to set forth our Vertues both to the good and view of others.

Riches and the goods of Fortune serve for the weale of the body, the body for the soule, the soule for God. [illegible]

Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods inward: they make not a man happy, but adorne him; they give his luster, not his being.

The thing that makes happinesse properly and principally is Vertue, yet Fortune must grace it; as the stones and timber make the house, yet for sight we could wish it pargetted, before we dwell in it: And though a man can foot it well, yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made. *Seneca.*

Vertue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure Councell, though his underlings be rebellious: He is able to keepe him in gard, though abroad there be mutinies; He may be happy in himselfe in despite of Fortune: like as a strong man can beare, if a greater weight should be laid upon him, and can suffer cold, though in the interim his teeth chatter.

An happy man vseth ill fortune, as a good Captaine bad armes, though unframable, yet using them according to art militarie, or as a skilfull craftsman shewing his art on a shooe of bad leather, both may doe well, but better, if their meanes were better.

The goods of the minde are either { 1 Wit for judging. 2 Will for choosing what we have judged. 3 Power for prosecuting what we haue chosen. 4 Ability for ordering our prosecutions.

Habits are the lowest gifts of the minde.

1 They are gotten by use and custome, the other are naturall.
2 They worke on passions, whose ground is sense.

The other are without sense, sith { 1 Prosecution 2 Choice. 3 Iudgement 4 Power. 5 Wit 6 Will. } are inseparate substances.

Habits are onely for the corporall.

Their kinds are { Intellectuall. Morall.

The

The intellectuall, some by doctrine, and instinction, and are 5. to wit,
1 Vnderstanding
2 Science } for contemplation.
3 Sapience.
4 Prudence. } for action.
5 Arte.

The morall come by use, and custom, *viz.*
If ruling passion, it is Vertue.
If ruled by it, it is Vice.

Their properties are
1 To be begotten by us.
2 Being gotten long to continue with us.

Qualitas acquisita difficulter mobilis.

The difference betwixt the worke of nature, and of manners is, Nature first begins with the habit, then comes to the action, as first we have the power of laughing, before the act: Manners are first in action, then in habit.

The goods of the body are
1 Health.
2 Strength.
3 Grace of person.

Though Vertue could appeare in deformity, yet it is more honourable in a comely personage: as the Ruby planted in iron hath his luster, yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold.

The goods of fortune are,
1 Wealth.
2 Worth of birth.
3 Reputation and credit.
4 Friends.
5 Goods of posterity.

1 Goods either in
Money.
Goods.
Lands.

The use and end
1 For necessity principally.
2 Then for
1 Not of pampering
2 But of recreation.
pleasure.

It is requisite for purveiance: Poverty and want are repining: necessity of having, armeth to importunity and impudency in procuring: Thence the beggers life, though most to bee pitied for want, yet deserves least favour for their boldnesse. The *Pythagoreans* would have an happy man wealthy, but not in abundance: That much prosperity is like over-much light, it quells the eye-sight. That we must wish for no more prosperity, then may fit us for action, as the Pilot takes not the ship of most weight, but of most convenience for coasting: That the evills of much prosperity are greater then they of adversitie; as in the body superfluities worke more dangerous diseases, then defects: That as affliction compells our minde, so height of wealth puffes it up, and empties it: Hence we see the rich often injurious and incroaching: A happy man by wisedome prevents these.

2. Worth of birth, this is requisite, that there bee no staine of blood. Low birth dejects the minde.

Bastardy is dishonourable, as debarring inheritance to the common rights of a Citizen.

Lewdnesse of parents is a disparagement to the child, as *Diogenes* seeing a boy wantonly given, gave this the reason of it, that surely his father was drunken, when hee begot him: Contrarily it was *Diophantes* brag, that hee could prevaile in any demand with the *Athenians*, sith his father *Themistocles* could doe so before him.

3. Reputation is either *viz.* in
Height of place, as preferments.
Good opinion of our fellow Citizens.

1 Preferments are properly due to the best: Lewd governours come in rather by intention then right: *Optimates* is an attribute to those, that for the common good so carry themselves, that *Sua consilia optimo cuique debentur*: They are

defined

defined by *Tully*, *Optimates sunt, qui nec nocentes sunt, nec natura improbi, nec furiosi, nec malis domesticis impediti*: Hence hee ranges even rusticks and tradesmen, so they be honest. Cicero pro Sextio.

The reason may be, the ground of civill society must be religion, and justice; without it can neither bee restraint from injuries, nor punishment of evill doers, nor reward for the well deserving. Wealth and Power make Society sparcke, and passable, but justice informes, and acts it: This is as the fonde to quicken it, that as the Organe to vent and spread it: Hence the right of governance principally is due to the best in life.

1 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the Vertuous.

It opens it selfe in { Words / Works } of service.

Three things breed in a man credit { Wisdome. / Honesty. / Love and kindnesse.

The speciall of these is Honestie: for a man truely honest hath that wisedome, that hee can distinguish the good from the bad; to follow the one and avoid the other: and his love is such, that he will labour to benefit all, and injury none: This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens it selfe into praise for actions extraordinary, into honour, glory and admiring: honour and admiration ascends upward, and is the title due to the extreme point of goodnesse: Wee yeeld it to things of most distance, and farthest out of our compasse: Hence all things most admired are most perfect: for the persons most admiring are of the lowest condition; therefore *Pythagoras* boasted hee had got this good by Philosophie, that hee had learned to wonder at nothing, sith admiration proceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance, then from a true view of judgement. Arist. 2. Rhet.

As in Nature there is excesse and defect, as in monsters, so in manners also. Things honoured and admired are out of the reach of Envie.

In vicina versamur invidia, simplicius longe posita miramur.

Hence good cannot be envied, since Envy is not at lower perfections: Praise is a title due to vertue, and is the reward of it; we attribute it not simply, but in comparison; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good, as because in that good hee exceeds others, that are in comparison worse then himselfe: Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others: *Non ut optimis par sit, sed ut malis melior.*

Glory is simply without reference to defects of others: It admits no proportion by reason of distance: praise may bee given and taken of equalls: Glory is for a Superiour onely; praise recants downewards to conferre with defects, and after conference to extoll the better deserts of the other: Glory admits not of comparing, but is a title absolute.

Hence *Felicitas bonum* { *Honorabile.* / *Non laudabile.*

4 Goods of posterity as of { Children / Kindred } somewhat to be respected of an happy man.

It followes him after death as a complement of his glory, yet so that it nothing detracts from him, if the contrary happen.

5 Friends are requisite to happinesse partly for { Use. / Comfort.

1 For use, sith a man cannot rely upon the purchase of his owne hands onely, but hee often requires an helpe: Management of things are sundry, and such they must each have their severall dispatch, they cannot so well bee compassed by one.

2 For comfort, sith a man is pliable to utter himselfe to some one of trust: Troubles are incident to all; and there is ease in reveiling them. —— *Strangulat inclusus dolor.* Againe our nature abandoneth solitarinesse: Presence of friends

friends keepes us from feeding on our owne hearts, like *Bellepheron* in the wildernesse.

Ipse suum cor edens hominum vestigia vitat.

To friendship three things are required, { 1 *Virtus, ut pulchrum.* 2 *Consuetudo, ut jucundum.* 3 *Usus, ut necessarium.*

Uertue the ground, that must begin it.
Pleasure, and conversation, that continue it.
Use and helpe, that must shew, utter and exercise it.

As it is the prop and stay of mans life, and follows immediately from the sociableness of his nature, so it relies on three goods,

The end of all appetites { *Bonum honestum.* *Bonum utile.* *Bonum jucundum.*

Friends must not be { suddenly gotten. many in multitude.

1 Sudden friends have but small root of loue.

It was *Zeuxis* answere when hee was reprehended for slow painting, that hee must bestow time in drawing those lines, which he hoped should continue for ever. Observance of their passions and qualities must precede, before we enter to close with them.

1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to us.

2 Whether they incroach not too fast into our acquaintance, for towardnesse of this is an occasion of suspect: for such a one is either a common friend and so lesse intire, or hee comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you.

2 Multitude of friends empties affection, as the channell must haue many shallowes, that is cut into sundry streames. One bragged to *Chilo*, that hee knew not many his enemies: hee replied that by that he knew, not many was his friends. Friendship is a tenure precise, and proper to one, not to bee enlarged to multitudes: *Agesilaus* would use all in courtesie, but hee was familiar and friendly but to few.

The Giant that had 50. bellies, was faine to haue an 100. hands, and had by this no more benefit of sustenance, then they that to one belly have but two hands, *Amicitia tantum inter duos.*

Men of worth have many fellows, few friends.

Friendship is when they follow principally for Vertue.

When they follow for goods outward { Countenance. Power.

1 Countenance: It is greatnesse of retinue usefull to men of place. *In pace decus, in bello præsidium.*

2 Power: It is faction, and by it they raise themselves, depresse their adversaries. In governement it is good to use men of one ranke equally: for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent. In favour it is best to use men with much difference, and election for it makes the persons preferred more carefull, and the rest more officious.

VI. *Things required to temporall Happinesse.*

HAppinesse being the perfection of man must bee in things that most honour him, nothing so worthy of him as vertue. It proceeds immediatly from his soule, as partaking both of wit and will.

Hence as beasts are devoid of both these, so they cannot be stiled { Vertuous. Happy.

To

To live according to vertue, and the prescript of nature is accounted all one. The reasons are three.

1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures, whose worke is for the best, and vertue is naught but the perfection of God.

2 Man by nature an image of God, as vertue and goodnesse flowes immediatly from the one, so ought from the other.

3 Our soule hath will and wit: Wit the apprehender of Truth, and Will of Good: the conioyning of both is mans nature, which of it selfe must both judge and affect true good: this onely is vertue. Vertue is termed by them any speciall action proper to any speciall nature: Heavens, Elements, and dead bodies are by nature active, and vertuous: As things are most materiall, so are they lesse quick: Hence soules are most vertuous, and this vertue is their felicitie.

VII. *Of Passions in generall.*

Passions are the matter of Vertue. Materia virtutis

They are the nailes, that fasten soule and body together.

In them we note their { 1 Rising and increase. 2 Issues and consequence. 3 Prevention and stopping.

Their rising partly from { 1 The soules nature. 2 The occurrences of objects.

The soule growes in passion { 1 Not by the understanding part. 2 But by the sensitive part, which { 1 Judgeth a truth. 2 Inducеth a colour of truth.

The sensitive works for passion { Abroad by the five outward senses. Within by the imagination or fansie.

The worke of the phantasie is to resume what the memory hath retained, and the common sense judged, and out of them to make collections of appearances.

These appearances goe masked under the habit of { Truth. Good.

If of truth, they perswade a weak understanding and so breed, *viz.* { 1 Curiosity, 2 Folly, 3 Giddines, } and hence are { 1 Hereticks. 2 Poets. 3 *Fond studets.* } These erre in the Theorie.

If of good they perswade a weake will, and breed some passions, which make men vicious and erre in the practicke: That which makes a fancy ventrous and resolved in these collections, is opinion proceeding naturally from the soule; and as phantasie is a part of it, so opinion must be the issue of it.

Hence arise the tenents against the Stoicks.

1 Passions are a naturall part of the soule.

2 They may bee moderated well from their excurrence, but cannot bee throughly barred of their existence in us.

3 They are not in themselves evill, but in their degrees.

4 They are often profitable, and meanes to further vertue, as feare teaches us to avoid evill, selfe love to prosecute our good, Mercy and pity teaches a King: Clemency and anger whetteth our valour.

5 Their excesse is not positively evill, but upon circumstances, as with my friend I may bee angry for his fault, but bee reconciled againe: with my foe I may be more implacable.

6 Though strengthened by opinion, yet not proceeding from without us, but naturall apprehensions within.

7 In a man two parts { Understanding / Sense } both in resistance to the other.

1 Understanding takes the good of most worth for honesty.
Hence ariseth conscience, *or conscientia*

2 Sense takes the good of most { Pleasure, / Profit. } hence are passions.

The will hath two inclinations to follow, either { Reason, or / Sense.

In judgement we often condemne, what in passion we prosecute.

——Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor——

Objects that move our phantasie, are { Evills to be avoided. / Goods to be followed.

The ground that perswades our soule to apprehend these objects, is selfe love.

This as it is { 1 Ruled by reason is good: and the duty of man. / 2 Ruled by sense is bad: and nurseth passions.

It may bee defined,—An inordinate inclination of the affecting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of right Reason.

The issues of passions, are { Generall. / Speciall,

1 The Generall are:

1 Rebellion against reason.
2 Division in themselves.
3 Insatiable in their extent.
4 Importunate for action. Hence they worke headinesse, and suddaine resolution.
5 Desirous of things { 1 Foolish. / 2 Inconvenient. / 3 Impossible.
6 Inconstancie of prosecution.

2 The speciall are:

1 Driving the body to distemper by { 1 Raising the humours. / 2 Altering the complexion. / 3 Forcing new motions.

As in feare the blood chilleth, in anger boiles, in griefe the heart closeth, in joy opens.

2 Blinding the judgement: The reason is,

The Understanding receives her notice from the fancies impression: which befriending passion representeth often to the judgement not true and reall, but apparent and conceited shapes.

3. Perverting our will.

The will inclines oftner to passion, then judgement, because passion is given more to choice and liberty.

The judgement is precise and setled to one part.

The prevention of passions is to { Discover / Temper } them.

1 Discovery is had,

1 From the use of company: as *Augustus* judged of his two daughters *Iulia* and *Livia*, finding one delighted to converse with grave men, the other with youngsters: pronounced the one stayed, the other light.

2 From the view of complexions; as the cholerick breeds anger; the sanguine pleasure; flegme sloth; melancholy sadnesse.

3 From the use of talke, as if it be { 1 Suddaine / 2 Often. / 3 Personally impeaching. / 4 Censuring.

2 To

2 To discover our selves observe wee what our enemies speake of us. They are ready to seize on what is faulty in us, when our selves are blinded with selfe love.

After the discovery our Passions must be tempered.

The temper of them must be reason, and wisedome checking the sence, and stopping the excurrence of Phantasie.

Men by reason teach birds to speake, dogs to hunt, horses to curvet, though sence perswade the contrary.

And wee discharge our selves of the meat wee have eaten with pleasure, when we heare it was poluted or forbidden.

The way to temper them is not to root out but to prune them, as the taming of Horses is not to take away their motion, but their skips: And *Lycurgus* should not so much cut downe the Vines to barre drunkennesse, as have planted cisterns of water to have allaied the heat thereof. It was *Zeno* his saying of musicall instruments, that even barren wood and dead guts would speake, if strained to their pitch, and ranked in order.

Wisdome must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions, if they over-grow.

Our wayes to slacke them are,

1 To bend to the other extreme; as if my sight bee scattered by view of white, I must regather it by viewing a black object: And *Epaminondas* way to stop his furfet on sweet meats, was to close his banquet with a draught of vineger.

2 Abstinence from things hurtfull, though lawfull.

3 Stop all occasions, that are motives to set passion on head.

4 Barre selfe conceits, and fancifull apprehentions.

5 Yeeld not to inconstancy and fleeting.

6 Labour to mortifie the flesh.

If Passion be too violent, that we cannot slack it, our labour must be,

1 To stay execution; As *Archytas* professed to his Bayliefe that carelesly kept his ground, that were he not angry, he would tell him part of his mind: And *Plato* would not himselfe beare his man, while hee was moved, but gave him up to *Speusippus* to be handled by him.

2 To conceale it in what wee may, for it breeds disrespect, if wee open our yeelding to it: this made *Plutarch* to bee upbraided by his servant, when hee could not dissemble his anger, that it was a shame for him to bee angry, sith hee had written a booke to the contrary.

A man (saith *Plato*) is sometimes his owne lord, when reason rules him; sometimes his owne vassall, when sence and passion.

VIII. *The division and number of Passions.*

The bent and aime of all Passions are either { The gaining of a good. / The avoidance of evill.

Good & evill are { gained / avoided } by 2. inclinations of the soule, { 1 The concupiscible that affects. / 2 The irascible that prosecutes & ventures on what we affect.

Both these have their objects { Good. / Evill.

The attainment of the { Good breeds pleasure. / Evill breeds griefe.

Thence { Pleasure / Griefe } are the heads of all passion.

The Passions aiming at good are either { 1 Love. 2 Desire. 3 Hope. 4 Boldnesse. 5 Pleasure.

The good presented is affected first by { Love. Desire. } these proceed from the concupiscible:
Then it is prosecuted for attainment by { Hope. Boldnesse. } these proceed out of the irascible.

Then being attained there resorts pleasure: this onely for the good present, the other for the good absent.

The Passions aiming at the avoidance of evill are:

1 Hate opposite to love.
2 Abomination or detesting, opposite to desire, being but the vehemence or high degree of hate, as desire is of love.
3 Despaire opposite to hope.
4 Feare to boldnesse.
5 Paine or griefe the ifflue of all, when the evill is in presence.

As { Goods / Evils } come nearer or further off their attainment, so they partake more or lesse of { Pleasure / Griefe.

These 10. Passions are simple, seeing they partake either of Pleasure alone, or griefe alone.

There are seven mixt Passions.

These worke either { on our selves, or on others.

1 They that worke on our selves are 2.
1 Shamefastnesse } mixt of { 1 Feare for infamy. 2 Sorrow for fault. 3 Desire of amendment.
2 Repentance }
2 They that work on others, are either { for them, or against them.
1 For them are 2.
3 Pitie whose object is the evill of another, which wee would have removed.

Mixt of { Griefe for the evills befalling / Desire for the removall of them.
4 Zeale, conceived in the behalfe of one we love.

Mixt of { 1 Griefe for the wrongs done. 2 Anger against the party wronging. 3 Love to the party wronged. 4 Boldnesse to right him in what wee may.

The Passions that worke against another, are either { In thought onely. Or in deed.
1 In thought, 1.
5 Jealousie or suspition mixt with { Griefe. Anger. Feare. Hate.
2 Indeed, 2.
6 Anger mixt with either { 1 Griefe for wrongs. 2 Hate against the party wronging. 3 Desire of revenge. 4 Boldnesse in venturing.
7 Maligning: This is different from anger, sith anger is moved upon wrong done: This without that motive: onely because it is well with another.

This

This containes { Envie, muttering at anothers good.
Nemesis, joying at others fall.

The former mixt of { Hate.
Griefe.
Desire of falling.

The latter of { Hate.
Joy for the evill fallen.

This of Passions in generall.

IX. *Of Love the first Passion.*

THe object of Love is goodnesse; the issue joy and content.
It is either with or without Passion.

1 Without Passion its in { God. Angels. } both have wills which are the affectors of good, and this affecting is Love.

1 Gods love is partly in { Reflexe to himselfe. Communicating good to others. *Viz.* The creatures.

1 By reflex into himselfe, he views his owne goodnesse: and goodnesse is the loadstone of love.

2 He communicates to creatures, goods of { Nature. Grace.

1 Nature is generall to all, and comprehends the works of { Creation Preservation temporall. } In this is the true *Bonum finis*, which God loves.

2 Grace is speciall to some & comprehends the spirituall acts of his love as { Redemption, Satisfaction, Glorification. } In this is the true *Bonum meritis*, and this is Gods love.

2 Angels love is by contemplation of { God. the works of God.

They see in all perfection of good, the fountaine is God, the streames scatter into each part of the world: Things they cannot hate, onely since they hate which is as nothing.

This love hath these tenents.

1 It is in the best natures, and the perfection of them.

2 As the best things are most lovely, so they are most in imparting their loves to others.

3 It is impotence to be hating, envying, murrhuring, all which are opposite to love.

4 It cannot bee perfect in man, it is truest in God, and nature; these are not interrupted by Passions.

5 The bond of Matrimony hath not truely this love, sith it is spiced with lust: wee may rather tearme it the Union of affections willed by God for avoidance of further evill.

6 It works for the best things with reluctance to sense.

2 Love with passion is either { Proper. Improper.

1 Love improper is in beasts, *viz.* the Empresse of Nature.

Birds build their neasts, and spare their owne crawes to fill their young ones: the Partridge flags before the Faukner, and ventures the taking, that her young ones may escape. The most timorous creatures grow most resolute in these combats: In the worst natures are some sparkles of love: As in Gold-mines amongst much earth shines a luster, and in beasts are rude lines of mans

naturall affection: As in wild figs and olives are the spices of the sweet though in harsher maner:

2 Love proper is in men alone.

It is is either of { our selves, / or others.

1 Love of our selves called φιλαυτια either { 1 True according to reason, / or / 2 Fancied according to sense.

1 True selfe-love apprehends that which is simply good, both in present and future.

It respects the goods of the soule before those of the body.

It chooses the lesse good of most durance before the greatest good of lesse continuance.

It is the well-head of Charity.

——*Charitas incipit a se ipso.*

And the spurre of Vertue, sith by it we benefit our selves.

Properties. 2 The properties of it are { Wishing / Working } the best to our selves.

3 Content with our owne parts, as of { Reason. / Passion.

4 Loving to retire into our owne thoughts.

5 Joying at our owne good and grieving at the contrary.

Hence it is the attribute onely of good men.

1 The evill follow showes, and opinative good, which failing breeds sorrow: the good man aimes at truth, and therein contents himselfe.

2 Conscience suffers not the evill to view their owne thoughts, they are at odds with themselves; Sense and Reason are hard at combate with them: Love cannot be there, where there is difference.

3 Selfe-love causeth Joy; Evill men, though they have joy of sense, they have griefe of reason, and their joy is not for durance, but ends in repentance.

4 Intemperance is the badge of evill men, whose { Soule / Body. } worke is to breed diseases in

A good man so loves himselfe, that he will either stop raising, or labour their alaying.

5 As goodnesse is wisedome, so evill is folly, which blindeth us, that wee cannot distinguish the good from the evill, but choose at randome, and so prove our selves without selfe-love.

The opposite of selfe-love is either a stupid neglect, or a desperate hate of himselfe, they that mangle themselves, are of this ranke: Selfe-love fancied according to sense is the badge of fooles; It is the seed plot of Passion, the bathe of Flatterers, the nurse of vices in manners reall, of Phantastick humors, in manners of Complement.

It ariseth from 3. heads, viz. { 1 Blindnesse of understanding. / 2 Easinesse of comparing our selves with others. / 3 Partiality in judging to our owne side.

The Issues of it are 4.

1 Admiration of our selves.

2 Arrogancy of speech.

3 Easie excusing our owne faults.

4 Despising of others admonition, and counsell.

The wayes to restraine it are.

1 Prize the Act of any above thine owne particular, as many eyes see more then one, and many hands make better riddance.

2 Amplifie others vertues, depressing thine owne.

3 Be sparing in vaunts, seldome in excuses.

This selfe-love barres the admittance of goodnesse: it comes not, unlesse it bee

bee sought. Sought it cannot bee, unlesse it be acknowledged wanting: Selfe-love barres this acknowledgement.

Multi ad ſalidam eruditionem perveniſſent
Nisi ſe pervenisse jam putaſſent.

Love to others is directed either to { God, or our Neighbours.

1 Love to God is onely in a sanctified will, none can truely hate him but sinners: The reason is because, God is Love, and sinne is in opposition to God.

2 Love to our Neighbours is either to { Enemies, or Friends.

1 Love to our enemies is one of the cunningst points of *Charity*, and an imitation of the Divine nature.

1 Pardoning them, if they repent, as the Lions doe the beasts, that submit themselves.

2 Pardoning them though persisting, and being without submission.

3 Not pardoning them onely, but working a good for them.

The Necessity of this Love is,

1 Because God loveth us being his enemies, and we must doe, as we would be doone unto.

2 There is none so bad but hath some what excellent in him, and none so harmed us now, but he may doe us good hereafter, and for this is to be loved.

2 Love to our friends is either { for publicke respect, or private, and particular.

1 Love for publicke respect is the love of our Countrey, that is the duety of all; but it is most splendent in heroicks, who pawne their life for it.

It was questioned, whether this love was ingrafted by nature, or assumed by custome? *Obiectus.*

1 If it come by nature, why doth not the poore love as well as the rich?

2 How comes it, that many for gaine leave their countrey, never to returne, sith where we love, we love to converse: Some have been Traitors against it, and *Neroes* to fire it.

Wee answere: Nature cannot bee so strict, right, and eeven, but sometime shee breeds Monsters; gaine may withdraw mens hearts, and fasten them to forraine Coasts.

The poore love their home, but rich men more, because they reape the goodnesse of their Countrey in a larger manner.

Mens love of Countrey is first for themselves, as wee feare stormes, lest our selves pinch for them, and wee quench a fire, lest our owne houses bee fired by it.

2 Love for private respects is either { 1 Ascending to our Superiours. 2 Descending to our inferiours. 3 Betwixt equalls.

1 That in descent is farre more hearty then that in ascent: Hence fathers are more loving to children, then children to fathers.

2 That betwixt Equalls stands upon more indifferency of points; and in the best counterpoise of either they may fall to jarring: Hence brothers and sisters fall to jarring, and friends have many distastes.

These Loves are linked either by bond { Naturall, or Civill.

1 The Naturall bond is three fold.

1 Under God to parents, who challenge of us { 1 Honour. 2 Maintenance, if need so require.

It

It was *Solons* law, that none should be free from their duty but those that had learned no trade of their fathers.

Parents are either of { 1 Blood, that frame us in body. 2 Manners, that by direction frame us in Soule; such are teachers.

It was *Socrates* his tenent, that by nature both these had challenge of Love: it is also doubted by many, whether *Alexanders* debt was not as ample to *Aristotle* his Master, as to *Philip* his father.

3 Our bond of nature is to { Brethren. Sisters.

They challenge of us,

1 Counsell.
2 Liberty of Conference.
3 Pleasure of Conversation.
4 Helps of Fortune; So wee wrong not our selves over much in furnishing them:

Vivet extento Procul ejus ævo
Notus in fratres animi paterni.

Brothers love is { 1 Honoured by our friends. 2 Envied and feared of our enemies. 3 Usefull to our selves. 4 Joyous to our Parents.

King *Eumenes* his Mother professed her selfe happy in this, that of 4 Sonnes 3 yongest squired the body of the eldest, and that *Eumenes* was nothing jealous or mistrustfull of them: Nature hath made them in a family feet to beare up our body both in equality and proportion; If they exceed, they cause halting, if they trip at one another, they cause falling.

A Lady of Persia made it a great dispute, whether they were better to lose her brother, or her sonne: she said they could get a new sonne, but a brother, sith her Parents were dead, they could not.

Brothers dislike (it may be) soone admits remedy, but their hate is irreconcileable: As the Joyntures of Art, though riven with rents, may be glewed againe, but Natures breach cannot.

The speciall Motives of their dislike are:

1 If we leave their commerce, and follow strangers, as if we should cut off our flesh and inch in the roome of it a strange peece: And the Arcadian Poet in *Homer*; when he had lost his legge, for his best helpe was to hoppe on a legge of wood; strangers will be distrustfull of us, sith we leave our owne.

Can you stile your friend brother, when you cannot account a brother your friend: as absurd a thing, as if you mangeled his naturall body; but hanged his Idoll with laces and Garlands.

2 If we are alwayes checking, and thwarting their courses, as *Lacy* said, by his short wife, of 2 Evils, the left is to be chosen: So if our brother be bad, rather let him have his fourth, then demerit his hate.

Though the dog bite and the horse throw us, yet we keepe them, and wee suffer Apes, Cats and Lyons, though sometimes harmefull.

Winking at faults in company is usefull, when wee would not displease, though it be not so honest, yet for avoydance of further Evills, it may be tolerated.

We must be our Brothers Friend, not his Judge.

3 Our bond of Nature is to our kinne either of { Blood, or Marriage, both galling offices of love proper to the family.

as Invitation { Marriage feasts. Funeralls.

2 The

2 The civill bond of love is to { 1 Citizens. 2 Countrey-men. 3 Strangers. } { As particular respects vary, so this order varies.

It is the engaging of man unto man in heart began by use and acquaintance: It acteth as one Soule in 2 Bodies.

There are two branches of it { 1 Wishing. 2 Indeavouring the best for another not for his owne but the others sake.

The maine motives of it are the 3 goods { 1 Pleasure. 2 Profit. 3 Honesty.

1 Pleasure } are the aimes of Epicures; loves as they are diverse, and fancifull, so
2 Profit } such loves must be.

3 Honesty makes love more setled: it appeares not as *Alcibiades* changing his coat to the fashion of the Place, but as *Socrates* keepes his tenor.

This love gets his growth by 3 knots { 1 Affecting. 2 Acquaintance. 3 Trust.

The Twine to winde and fasten it must be a Resemblance of Manners.

Motives to make me affect one

1 I see him sympathize with my { Joy / Griefe } befreinding *Brutus*.

2 He accounts my friends his, and my enemies his; So *Cicero* loved *Appius Pulcher* for *Brutus* his sake, and by it bound *Brutus* the more to him.

3 He is pleasant-hearted and Jesting; If I jest with him he takes it not amisse.

4 He reports well of me behind my backe, and rather in secret shews his mind then in publike it should be told me.

5 He delights in my Company.

6 He goes neat, but curious in apparrell: this was *Demosthenes* and *Hortensius* his tricke to get them favorites, when they first began pleading.

7 He lives peaceably with others, which perswades me, hee will doe so with mee too.

These things may move affecting in me not acquaintance, sith the { Flatterer / Dissembler } may doe as much.

Motives to moove me to acquaintance.

1 He reports well of me before mine Enemies, and if they except, he defends mee.

2 I see him honestly given not giddily.

3 He doth me a good turne, so it be no prejudice to himselfe.

4 He is no busie-medler in my matters.

5 He overthwarts me not in talke, especially being eather serious or angry.

6 He keepes the 7 former motives without dissimulation. These move acquaintance, and I would trust him in matters obvious, and ordinary, but in things secret, and neerely touching me, I may not, unlesse he had Wisdome joyned to his Honesty.

Motives to move me to trust him.

1 He hath all the 7 former circumstances without dissimulation and the 6 latter with wisdome.

2 He is wary, that he be not felt by others to open himselfe by Ignorance.

3 He doth me a good turne though to his owne Preiudice.

4 If I have wronged him, he will not revenge it, though having opportunity.

5 He suffers wrong for my sake.

6 He discloseth to me his heart, opens his faults, sheweth me his hopes and feares.

This makes the upshot of love, and the Bond of Friendship. As the Diamond engraves the Diamond, and fire encreases fire: so his love encreaseth my love, and

and makes up an Union betweene us.

Satis de Amore prima Passione.

X. *Of Desire the 2. Passion.*

DEsire is the stoppe, and scale of Love; it addes vehemency to our affecting. The object of it is some pleasing good; The issue delight.

Goods are made pleasant unto us either by { Nature or / Custome.

1 By nature are such as in themselves have no Paine.

2 By Custome the hunts-man affects the cold winters walkes, and the student loveth his watchings, and they are desirable to him, though in themselves painfull, but are pleasant for the End.

Desire is partly { with Hope. / without hope.

1 If a thing desired be within compasse of attainement we raise up our powers within, and watch helps abroad to gaine it, then desire is joyned with Hope.

2 If it be not likely to be gained, it leaves hope, and spends it selfe onely in wishing.

Thus we desire { Mines of Gold / Managements of States } though there be no hope or expectance of it.

About Desire are these Tenents.

1 It is a note of want, and impotency. Thence the covetous are said alwaies to be wanting in their greatest Abundance.

2 It is never but with griefe, till the thing be obtained, and in the attainement it ceases. Hence it cannot be in God, seeing in him is no Want, Griefe, or Passibility of Nature.

3 We cannot desire things, we know not.

4 It is limited onely by satisfaction; without it growes eager importunity.

5 It is grounded onely upon Sence: Angels properly have it not, nor Plants.

6 It appeares first in beasts: In a more pregnant manner it is in men, seeing in them the sensible part is more various, as having opinion to float and to cast their desire to infinite resolutions which beasts want.

Desire is either { Proper, / or / Improper.

1 The Improper is an Inclination to the regaining of a Good; this is called *Appetitus naturalis*, by which the Earth beareth downeward, the fire upward, and it appeares in all naturall bodies.

2 The Proper is in men principally.

This is for the bettering either of the { Reasonable part, / or / Sensible part.

1 For the reasonable, there is a desire of knowledge naturally in-grafted in the Soule.

2 For the sensitive part, the desires are either necessary as of { Meats. / Drinks.

Naturally not necessary, as Venery, which though it be necessary to man in *Specie*, yet is not to this or that man in *Individuo*: Neither naturall, nor necessary as are all Phantasies and conceited Appetites.

The 2 former are common to men with beasts.

The last comes by an Opinative apprehension of Colourable goods, it opens it selfe most in excesse of things: It growes boundlesse and infinite, for as opinion is infinite, so these desires brooded and hatched by it must be infinite.

Fancied

Fancied Desires are, either { Extraordinary. / Ordinary.

1 The extraordinary are caused by diseases, as the cholerick desires honey, the Fever-sicke wine, others eate chalke, coales, &c. or are incident to great bellies, whose longing proceeds from a raw cold Humor; If they faile of it, they either endanger themselves, or their infants; it comes especially, when they travell for Wenches. The Low-countrey-women of all others are most given to these desires, because of their coldnesse of temper.

2 The ordinary ariseth from voluntary Passions.

They bend either to { Pleasure. / Profit.

1 The desires bending to Pleasures are mainly to sooth the five senses. These are craving and excessive, all joyned make up luxury. *Cleopatra* in her voyage to *Anthony* had all these; odours for her smell, musick for her eares, cakes for her taste, costly hangings and soft pillowes for her sight and touch.

The like was noted of *Antiochus* in his warres against the Romans. *Livius Lib.*

The two senses that luxury seeks to please, are { Touching. / Tasting.

From these arise two importunate ones { 1 Lust for Venery. { Meats. / 2 Liquorousnesse for { Drinks.

The excurrences of both these are a certaine signe of a corrupt, lewd, end intemperate soule.

1 Lust is in beasts, but exceeds in men.

1 Beasts have it but at set times, men at their pleasure, *ad Libitum*.

2 Beasts have it lesse violently, men, so, that many have wrought their deaths for it.

The onely way to allay it, and to excell beasts is { Right reason. / Religion.

Our caveats against it must be to avoid wanton { 1 Words. / 2 Gestures. / 3 Meats.

It never admits moderation, and warrantize, but onely in the bond of Marriage.

2 Liquorousnesse for meats and drinks aimes not at necessity, but pampering: thence it cannot be truely in beasts, who feed not but for hunger.

This Desire is seene in us, either { Eating overmuch. / Too greedily for the time. / Inseasonably at all times. / Feeding rather on delicates, then strong meats.

It is *Seneca's* saying of the Belly: *Parvo contentus est, si des illi quod debes, non quod potes.*

2 Desires aiming at profit are either of { Wealth, as Covetousnesse. / Honour, as Ambition.

1 Covetousnesse is for the Purse, it gapes after money, either to have it only in possession, this is Parsimony: or to have it for Use and purveiance, not of nature, but of superfluities: This desire may be termed Vaunting, or ostentation.

Parsimony is onely to have, not to use; It is the truest note of poverty. *Plutarch.*

Increase rather feeds, then allaies it: hee that still drinks, and cannot bee satisfied, needs rather purging, then filling.

These extort from others not to benefit themselves: but wee rather hate the Viper, that stings onely to kill, then the Beare or Lion, that kill onely to eate.

They make others to want: yet themselves are like the Bath-masters Asses, that carry on their backs the Rubbers and the cleansing Towels, yet they themselves are all miry with filth: they never profit, but by their death. As a kind of

of mice feeding in the gold-mines eate the Oare, yet redeliver it not till they be exenterated.

This desire growes infinite, and ariseth from 3. heads.

1 Imitation of them, whom we see to prosper and we wish to be as they are.

2 We make Wealth our End, not our meanes *Concupiscentia finis totam infinitam*; meanes to Ends are bounded, sith the end is beyond them.

3 Riches are for Use; they are not of themselves good: As man cannot bee sure of his estate, but hee may require helps from them, and as losses are ever imminent, so riches are ever desired for prevention: Desire of money for Ostentation aimes wholly at superfluity: if at necessaries, the poore might equall the rich in this Kind: And *Diogenes* might by this as well vaunt himselfe in his Tubb, as *Alexander* in his Throne. One came to *Scopa Thessalus*, but to beg some of his superfluous stuffe, his answere was, That the grace of his Wealth was seene in superfluities rather then in necessaries. If *Ismenias* at *Thebes*, and *Callias* at *Athens* both the richest of their times, bare no greater port then *Epaminondas*, or *Socrates*, wee might terme their Wealth blind, and heartlesse: Therefore *Telemachus* in *Homer* passes over *Nestors* houshold, where all was frugall, nothing superfluous, but amplifies in rich termes the gaudie and costly furniture of *Menelaus*.

This Desire ends in expence, as the former in keeping.

They are opposed as Logicke and Rhetoricke, the one resembles the hand in spreading, the other in closing.

Logicke is for the Covetous to learne to count *rationem computi*. As Rhetoricke for the Vaunter to vent, and utter himselfe: this is the chiefe factor for gaines both to antique, and moderne pleaders.

——Ciceroni nemo ducentos
Iam dederit nummos, nisi fulserit annulus ingens, &c.

The way to stop both these golden desires is contentation in our present estate: this is called by *Socrates* the Soules riches.

Senec: *Brevissima ad divitias per contemptum divitiarum via.*

2 Desire of honour termed { Ambition, is either of { Low and competent / Highest and best } Honours.

It ariseth from two heads.

1 Presumption of our owne worth.

2 Pride over others.

The abates of it are { Humility in respect of our selves. / Charity in respect of others.

As wee may not meerely want this desire, so wee must not let it exceed in us; the excesse breeds envy in all; the defect is faulty onely in those, which have desert, occasion, and fit meanes to gaine their honour.

Men of worth to extenuate their goods, and gifts, when necessity requires their triall, is to bury their goods with them, and to wrong the Weale publick.

This desire in the meane is onely allowable.

If it bee of lower Honours it is termed Modesty, if it perch to the highest, it is magnanimity, and is onely for great hearts, and the best perfections.

Both these are grounded on foure conditions.

1 That wee challenge no more honour, then what in the opinion of the best we have deserved.

2 That we get them by lawfull meanes, not by out-stripping others.

3 That we rest without seeking more, having gotten the former,

Unlesse they be { Easily offered. / Forcibly put on us.

4 That wee keepe our Place, and defend it against all back biters, and murmurers.

Satis de cupiditate secundâ Passione.

XI. *Of Hope the 2. Passion.*

AS Love and Desire is { Hope / Boldnesse } to affect good, so { } to prosecute it.

The 2. former come from the concupiscible, as a lord to will.

The 2. latter as a steward to purvey, and proceeds from the Irascible.

Love is the base to Desire; so Hope to Boldnesse.

1 It is alwaies the apprehender of Good.

2 The goods must not be in presence, but in future.

3 It must be of a thing not easie, and without search, but hard to compasse.

4 It must not be so hard, but it must apparantly be in possibility to attaine.

It hath these Tenents.

1 It is never without assurance, though not of the thing, yet of perswasion.

2 It makes us take delight in things painefull.

3 The surer the hope is, the greater is the joy, when the thing is attained.

4 It brings security, and barreth feare.

5 The adjunct of it is Expectation; herein is some griefe sith wee yet want the good, which we would have in presence.

6 It is a note of imperfection of being: whence it is onely for this life, it goes not beyond.

7 It moves our powers of { Body / Soule } for atchievements.

The Persons given to Hope are,

1 They that either have deserved, or intend to deserve well of us.

2 They that have potency of friends and best meanes.

3 They that have hot and quick spirits, which enlarge our hearts to attempts. Hence young men, and drunkards are most given this way.

Old men are least hoping, { 1 For the coldnesse of temper, making them unfit to attempt. / 2 For their experience of many dangers, and stoppages, which contrary, and crosse their hope. }

4 They that quickly apprehend the good, but fore-cast not the stoppage in the way, that hinders the good: Thence fooles, and inconsiderate persons build onely upon hope.

The kinds of Hope.

Hope is either { 1 Naturall. / 2 Supernaturall, or Theologicall. }

1. The Supernaturall is a Vertue onely infused by God.

The second sister to { Faith. / Charity. }

2. The Naturall is either { Improper. / Proper. }

1 Improperly it is in beasts: As the Dog springs the Deere within compasse of attaining, hopes to take him: So the Hauke the Partridge.

Object. How should beasts have hope, sith hope comes from the Understanding?

Solut. Beasts have their naturall instinct which proceeds from God, and understanding without them: by it they judge of things future, as the Emmot foresees the cold Winter, Mice leave the house, when it begins to fall, and Ravens oft foretell weather.

2 Hope Proper, is in men onely.

It is either of things { Necessary, that must be. / Possible, that may be otherwise.

1 Things necessary are hoped for: as the Jewes calling, the worlds end, the Resurrection, which cannot be otherwise, because God hath appointed it.

Things Possible are attained { Partly by our selves. / Partly by others.

Then our Hope relies much on others helpe.

Motives to raise hope.

1 Shew the meanes to be strong and pregnant.

2 That the evills feared are not in proportion to the goods expected.

3 That to men of religion wee must not urge the generall onely but the particular providence of God.

4 To grave men use rather few and strong reasons, then many and weake: To the common sort use probabilities rather of circumstance then realities of substance, because of ignorance they are led most with conjectures.

Satis de Spe 3°. Passione.

XII. *Of Boldnesse the 4th Passion.*

BOldnesse heartens our Hope, as desire doth our Love.

Its object is mixt { Evills to be removed. / Goods to be attained.

It goes under the name of Conscience and Courage: It begins with reluctance, and strugling, but ends with Victory.

Courage is either { Suddaine upon Sense. / Deliberate upon Reason.

1 That upon Sense grounds onely upon a presuming hope; weighes not every occurrence of danger, begins with resolution, but seeing dangers arise unlooked for, slacks and often failes, before it overcome: Thus quicke in the onset, but slow in the issue.

2 That upon reason begins slowly, endeth ventrously, viewes every circumstance, fore-layes the uttermost of dangers: If it happens lesse then his account, it heartens him the more, hee resolves to conquer by out-facing danger.

An example of both is seene in *Lucius Paulus*, and *Terentius Varro* the 2. Roman Generall at the overthrow of *Canna*.

Courage hath his two extreames { Heady rashnesse. / Base cowardize.

The parties most couragious are.

1 Whose temper of body is such, that they are hot spirited; which happens in three sorts of men.

1 Whose heart is little, because of combring and closing of spirits, whereas in the larger hearts their diffusion causeth feare.

2 Whose lungs are greatest and fullest of blood: This argues plenty of heat and much quicknesse.

3 Who are heated with much wine: Thence the *Germans* used it principally in their consultations of Warre: And *Alexanders* drinking was thought to adde somewhat to his courage.

2 They that have many and strong helps, are ventrous.

3 They that be most subject to choller.

4 They that rely on Gods promises, and cast their hopes upon him.

Hence it is that Martyrs are most resolute.

5 They that have a conscience of their innocency: on the contrary they are most fearfull, which have beene most injurious.

6 They

6 They that have oft escaped dangers: hence old Souldiers are more venturous then fresh-water-men.

7 They that see not inconveniences, and stops: Hence the wiser sort are more cautelous, and none so desperate, as he, that fore-sees least.

5. Motives to make courageous.

1 Shew the excellence of the Victory: the meanes easie, and present that must compasse it.

2 If our equalls and inferiours have overcome: why should not wee hope the like? It was *Cicero's* argument to perswade the sufferance of evill. If children at *Sparta* could endure stroakes without groaning, why should not men? And amongst men if the barbarous vaunt before their enemies, why should the learned tremble?

3 Set them into anger: this makes a boiling of their blood, and by consequence courage: Anger is wrought by laying open their wrongs and disgraces offered without a cause.

4 Shew the { Paucity / Weakenesse } of their enemies, { Will not / Dare not } oppose them.

5 That in former combats they have had successe, and why not in these standing in the same proportion.

Our maine worke must be to { Perswade hope. / Expell feare. }

Satis de Fiduciâ 4ª Passione.

XIII. *Of Pleasure the 5th. Passion.*

THis is the aime and up-shot of the 4. former Passions.

{ Love / Desire } are like the qualities of lightnesse in fire, which inclineth it to make { Hope / Boldnesse } like the motion or passage of it.

Pleasure results as the quietnesse and rest of the Soule in her object: it is never hearty before the goods are in presence.

It is generally in men and beasts; it is tearmed properly pleasure, or delight: As it is in men by opinion, it is called Joy, *Gaudium*.

This in men hath 2. operations, *scil.*
1 Enlarging the heart: hence properly it is called *Latitia, quasi latitia.*
2 Forcing outward gestures, and so it is called *Exultatio.* *Aquinas.*

The tenents touching it are.

1 No Passion is so vehement: So that many have died of it: the reason is because it opens the heart, and being overmuch passes out the spirits that keepe in life.

2 The greater joy, the greater content, and in men it is the consequent of happinesse.

3 It is never true, and of continuance, but where there is peace of conscience.

4 It is the adjunct of Vertue.

5 It is increated by variety of objects.

6 It purifies the soule, helpes concoction, expells superfluities.

Hence the merry have { Good wits. / Faire complexions. }

7 It is for goods present: though wee joy for remembrance of things past, or for hope of things future, yet they are apprehended by us in a sort of presence.

Motives to raise delights in a man are,

1 Perswade him to a { Love } of those things, wee would have him de- { Desire } lighted in.

2 Marke his inclination, sort, profession, and frame your selfe to the like practises.

3 Amplifie the goodnesse of the thing, we would have him delight in, not by describing it in grosse, but viewing every particular: Thence Poets in their love-legends describe every part of their Mis. the more to delight.

4 Shew the continuance of this joy, that it breeds not after-repentance. Variety causeth delight, and uniformity raiseth loathing.

Pleasure is { Common to men with beasts. / Proper to men alone.

1 That in common is the issue of Sense, and comes from a naturall appetite.

It is { Negative for the avoidance onely of trouble. / Positive for the gaining of some reall good.

This grounded on two conditions, *viz.* { 1 The attaining of a good convenient. / 2 The perswasion that we have attained it.

2 That proper to men is voluntary and hatched by Opinion.

It is either of { Mind, or { Body. } The pleasures of the mind are best, { yet all not warrantable, as the } { Prone / Malicious } take delight in the passions, yet their minds are corrupt: these begin in hope, but end in shame and griefe.

The truest delight of the mind without repentance is { 1 Meditation on God, and heavenly things. / 2 The view of learning.

Eudoxus wished to bee burned with *Phaeton*, so he might stand neere the Sunne to contemplate the nature of it: And *Archimedes* left not his drawing of lines, till a sword was drawen through his body.

Pleasures of the body are sensuall, and quickly exceed Measure.

The properties of them are { 1 Inconstancy and fleeting. / 2 Saciety, and cloying like rancke meat. / 3 Ending in repentance. / 4 They quench the thirst no more then salt-water, that wets the palate, but inflames the stomacke.

They are perswaded by three enemies, { 1 World. / 2 Flesh. / 3 Devill.

The Worldlings take { Present / Apparent } Joy for future, and reall paine.

The good had rather suffer heere, and play hereafter.

Sensuall pleasures proceed from the diverse affecting of the Senses, as musicke, and odours affect the eare and smell, pictures the eye, &c. The strongest delight comes from the Sence of touching. The reason is, Delight is caused of Love: we love those things that most befreed us; of all the Senses touching is most usefull, without which it is impossible we should live: And as the goods affected by it are more deare; so the pleasure, when it is attained, must be more moving.

These bodily exercises in their Excesse distract the minds, and hinder the use of right reason.

XIV. *Of Hate and Detesting.*

These are the two opposites of { Love. / Desire. } { Hate begins the dislike, detesting is the vehemency of it.

The object of both is evill:

It is either of the { Thing. / Person.

1 The thing hated principally is sinne, and for it we dislike of the Person.

Sinne is against the law of { 1. Nature, this breeds the hate of either { Moralists. / Heathens. } { sith all partake of nature, and are bound to its lawes. / 2. Grace, this breeds the hate of Christians.

2 The Person we may not simply hate. It is proper to

Vbicunque homo est, ibi beneficio locus est. Seneca.

Three heads of sinne move hate { 1 Irreligion towards God. / 2 Injustice towards men. / 3 A selfe inclination to evills without outward motives.

If these heads grow stronger, and are done wilfully, it transcends hate, and moves detestation.

The principall object of it is Atheisme.

1 It is the ground-plot of all other sinnes.

2 It is an evill of Will, not of Understanding; wee cannot alledge ignorance for that, which the creature reveales. It is voluntary presumption.

3 Atheists are most unfit for Society.

Their commerce is either { 1 Scoffing. / 2 Impudency. / 3 Vaine.

of that constitution, as is most contrary to wisdome, and morall gravity:

These things move the greatest detestation.

Hate is either { In common against states. / Particular for private respects.

1 That in common arises, if { Their religion be in opposition to ours. / Their lawes be against nature. / Their oft injuries done bee without hope of righting.

2 Hate for private respects, is { 1 Against a wronger of many, as { 1 Tirants. / 2 Extortioners. / 2 Against a wronger of himselfe onely for the indignity of his person.

This is set downe by its life { 1 Towards God. / 2 Towards himselfe. / 3 Towards his neighbour.

His entry into the world is shamefull, his stay, and departure hence with mistreport, like a snuffe leaving a stincke, when the light is out.

Satis de odio, & detestatione.

XV. *Of Despaire and Feare.*

THese two are opposite to { Hope. / Boldnesse.

Their speciall Art is in avoiding the future evill, which seeing they cannot master, they yeeld.

1 Despaire ariseth from faile of helpes.
2 Feare from the imminence of evils.

The tenents of despaire are 3.

1 It dejecteth the minde.
2 It makes venterous to try the utmost of dangers.
3 It is deepest in them, who before had greatest hopes.

The tenents of feare are 3.

1 It is never moved, but where some spice of hope is, for things without remedy rather despaire, then feare.
2 The greater the things feared, and of longer continuance, the greater is the feare.
3 It prepares Patience, awakes industry, whereas despaire is only in suffering.

It ariseth from 3. heads: { 1 The debility of the person. / 2 The greatnesse of the danger. / 3 The certainty and imminency thereof.

Feare is either of a { Person. / Thing.

1 Of a Person it is either { 1 Filiall, which is properly love. / 2 Servile, which is onely for escape.

The persons most feared by us are.

1 Great men offended with us.
2 Lewd men made powerfull.
3 They who stand in bodily feare of us.
4 High stomacks wronged by us.
5 They, who have our life and credit in their hands.

We feare them either { 1 As in themselves faithlesse. / 2 To be provoked by { 1 Gaine. / 2 Threats. / 3 Danger on their part. / 4 Want of service on our part.

Persons not much to be feared are:

1 They that are soone angry, and soone pleased.
2 They which open themselves too much in menaces and threats.
3 They that disclose their purposes. The close heart concocts malice. *Ulisses* is said to dissemble his dislike for the Woers riot; but revenged them at occasion. *Anthony* and *Dolabella* traid not *Cæsar*, though they conspired against him: Hee answered he feared not those fatt, and open fac'd *Traitors*, but two leane ones *Brutus* and *Cassius* which proved his deaths-men. *Demissos animo, & tacitos vitare memento.*

2 Things feared are evills { 1 Destruction to the whole man, or / 2 Baine to any part of him.

Evills are of { 1 Sinne, *malum culpæ.* / 2 Punishment, *malum pœnæ.*

1 The former is feared by the best men.
2 The latter is feared by the worst.

The parties most fearefull are:

1 They, whose quantity of heart is such, that it diffuseth the spirits.

2 They,

2 They, that know their owne weakneſſe, and others ableneſſe to hurt.
3 They, that amplifie on the evills feared.

The parties leaſt fearefull are,

The { Wiſe, { who count { Sinne, } which they endeavour to avoid.
{ Juſt, { no evill but { Diſgrace, }

1 The moſt courageous.
2 They that preferre honour before their lives.
3 They that have ſtrength of meanes to backe them.

Satis de deſperatione, & metu.

XVI. *Of Griefe.*

GRiefe is the end of the former Paſſions, and ariſeth from the preſence of evill. *Livius Lib.*

It is of { Body. } That of the minde is more dangerous.
{ Minde. }

The tenents of it are:

1 It never touches things of abſolute perfection, as God, Angels, &c. but is there moſt frequent, where is moſt plenty of evills, as in hell.
2 It drieth the body, and ingendreth melancholy by cold blood.
3 It makes one unfit for Action.

It growes upon us by { 1 Yeelding too much to pleaſures.
{ 2 Entertaining a conceit of evills preſent.

The way to reſiſt it in our ſelves

1 Propoſe to your ſelves examples of Patience, as of *Marius. Ita enim dolorem; ut vir et ut homo majorem ferre ſine cauſa neceſſaria noluit.*
2 Reſolve to reſiſt evills. As that Souldier, that ſtands it out, often winnes, when the coward dies by flight. *Animi contentio Sola officij tanquam cuſtodia*
3 That the evills now are not ſo great, but the goods enſuing counterpoiſe them.

The way to allay it in others is comfort. { Perſwaſion of a good to come.
{ Removall of an evill preſent.

In it are two things.

1 The time to apply it, when the griefe is ripened, not newly begun: As Surgeons firſt let the ſore ſoften, before they begin to draw it.
2 The manner of applying it is { Generall.
{ Speciall.

1 The Generall by theſe places.

1 Shew how greater evills have happened to others, then we now ſuffer. It was *Socrates* his ſaying, If of all mens evills heaped together all ſhould haue equall ſhare, each would reſt content with their preſent eſtate.
2 Our evills be ordinary, and doe what we can, we ſhall have { 1 Cares of minde.
{ 2 Diſeaſes of body.
3 If the thing be revocable, ſhew the meanes of regaining it; if not, yet it is a folly to mourne for it.
4 That God ſees what is better for us, then we for our ſelves.

2 The Speciall is according to the maine motives of Griefe.

1 Theſe are { Death.
{ Temporall misfortune.

2 Our comfort againſt death is.

1 It is unavoydable by fate, and all men muſt, and doe taſte of it.
2 It is no evill, but a paſſage to a better life.
3 Our life hath many troubles, and anguiſhes, death is the quiet of them.

4 If

4 If we grieve for the dead, then either, because they are not, or because they are in torment; If they are not, why grieve wee more for their now not-being, then for our children yet unborne; If they be in torment, it is seene, they were evill, we were the better rid of them.

Of deaths they are most { Suddaine. / grievous, that are { Untimely.

Against these our comforts are 3.

1 We ever beare Corruption in our flesh, that in a moment may kill us.

2 Dying young makes us lesse fixt to the world, and fitter for God *to call back, unbraces vs.* Hee calls us hence as from a banquet, lest overmuch sitting should make us surfeit.

3 The thing cannot be suddaine, sith we are ever liable to evill. Wee ought ever to expect it,

2. Our comfort for temporall misfortunes.

1 They come from Gods decree, and so are necessary to fall on us.

2 They are profitable unto us, and debarre our insolence.

3 They may befall any as well as us.

4 Shall we grieve ever or leave at last? If ever, too great a misery we impose on us: if we will leave, why resolve we not at first?

The persons most given to Griefe are 3.

1 Whose temper of body is Melancholy.

2 Women, because of their easinesse in yeelding.

3 They, who have given themselves to overmuch joy.

This falling must end in depth of griefe.

Satis de dolore.

XVII. *Of Shamefastnesse.*

IT is a mixt Passion { Feare of infamy. / joyned with { Love of Honesty.

It ariseth partly { before a fault. / { After a fault.

It is onely in good natures, but unsteddy, soone failing, and easily revoked by counsell: It is commendable in youth, but not in the aged.

The effects of it are 2.

1 It moves to vertue, thence termed *Purpura virtutis.*

2 It calls blood into the face. Reason and Passion move the heart; the heart, the spirits, the spirits the blood.

Now shame consists { 1 Feare, that gathers blood to the heart. / of 2. Passions { 2 Love, that sends it abroad to the outward parts.

If wee feare onely disgrace and have no love to good, our blood keepes within: This is the signe of a bad nature, which being convicted of faults lookes not red, but pale in the face.

If we feare not onely disgrace, but love and desire amendment, our blood spreadeth outward, and causeth blushing. *Aristoteles* his daughter being asked, what shee counted the fairest colour, answered, the ruddy caused by an ingenuous blush.

It is a note of the best natures, and fittest for counsell.

The reason why the blood sheweth it selfe most in the face is, because as the blood is moved by the spirits, so the spirits are most quicke, that animate the organ of sence; and the organs of sence principally are about the face.

The extremes of shame are { 1 *Aidoia* an overbashfulnesse. / { 2 Impudence, the defect of shame.

Bashfulnesse

Bashfulnesse in it selfe is not evill, but may often be a prouocation to evill. It is grounded upon an overlenity of nature, and easinesse of yeelding. The object of it is feare of infamy. The persons whom it may hurt are 5.

1 Young men as leading them to an unsetled and floating carriage in manners.
2 It makes them easie to suitors, without respect of their choice.
3 Incontinent persons; it makes them unable to resist evill motions, though in the yeelding they grieve at it.
4 It debarreth their courage in punishing faults, and makes them loath to displease.
5 They which are rich, powerfull, kind-hearted, and have many helps to further others.

1 It makes the rich { Rash lenders. / Heady sureties.
2 The kind-hearted by it either { 1 Follow the riot of bad company. / 2 Beare false witnes for their acquaintance. / 3 Soone take paines for others. / 4 Joine them to unworthy men.
3 The powerfull have many suitors, and by it are made easie to yeeld to any demand, and prefer without election.

The way to barre it is to acquaint our selves with resistance to motions, denials of suits, if they be not honest, and convenient, but hurtfull to the granter.

The inhabitants of *Asia* were all slaves, because they could not pronounce this word ∞. And *Brutus* said:

Impudence passes not feare of infamy.

The difference betwixt it and bashfulnesse is, that the bashfull retaine a love of Vertue, the impudent doe not.

Periit, cui perit pudor.

Satis de pudore.

XVIII. *Of Repentance.*

What it is.

Repentance is an act of conscience arising from the thought of an evill done.

It is either { 1 Theologicall, because of offences done against the law of Grace. / 2 Morall, because of things done against the law of nature, or common Honesty.

1 Repentance theologicall is in Christians alone.
2 Morall is in Heathens.

It is raised by three motives, { 1 Infamy. / 2 Punishment. / 3 Hate of vice.

1 That arising from feare of infamy, and punishment is slavish, and incident to the most.
2 The best repent for the hate of vice: For as they love good for the good, not for reward; so they hate evill for the evills sake, not for the punishment.

The parts of repentance are two { 1 Hate of the evill done. / 2 Resolution of amendment.

It is described three wayes { 1 By contrition of the heart. / 2 By confession of the mouth. / 3 By satisfaction by good workes.

Its properties are three.

1 Repentance must be with vehemency of griefe, least while our griefe for the

the fault slackens, our care for amendment slackens also.

2 It must not be for a time, but for continuance, sith evill is ever to bee hated, and good ever to be resolved upon.

3 It must not be deferred, least delay breed custome of evill, and custome hardnesse of heart.

The stops of repentance are 7.

1 Shame to confesse our faults, or pride in not acknowledging them.
2 Delighting in our sinnes.
3 Hope of long life.
4 Despaire of obtaining grace.
5 Presumption of Gods mercy.
6 Long custome of sinning.
7 Examples of bad men, which have long flourished, yet never repented.

The tenents of repentance are 5.

1 Repentance cannot be in a nature meerely good, as God, nor meerely bad, as the Devill; but in such onely as are partly good, and partly bad, as in men.

These are { Bad by nature; hence they offend. / Good by grace; hence they amend.

2 It is onely in things that bee to fall: Beasts have it not: those actions are not voluntary, but necessary, which cannot be repented of.

3 It ariseth from a knowledge, and taste of sinne committed: thence children have it not.

4 It groundeth on hope: They that die desperate have it not, sith the desperate are swallowed up with griefe: The repentant receive griefe for the evill past, but joy for the future good, and future things more move then those past.

5 Repentance is joyned with shame, as impenitence is joyned with impudence.

XIX. *Of Pitie.*

Pitie lookes outwardly to the evills of others, but by reflex to our owne.

It is mixed with { Griefe for the evills fallen. / Desire for their remedy.

Evills that raise pity are 4. { 1 Griefe of mind. / 2 Torture of body. / 3 Danger of others death. / 4 Misfortune in goods.

The evills move most { 1 If they are so neere to fall, that we feare them. / 2 If so lately fallen, that we freshly remember them. / 3 If their then present falling barres our expectance of contrary profit.

The ground of pity is our communion of nature.

The extent of it is a desire to helpe.

This desire hath 2. conditions, { If we are able to helpe. / If justice permit.

1 Grieving for such as lawes and justice will have banished, is womanish.

2 For those we are not able to remedy, it is fruitlesse.

The tenents of pity are 4.

1 The better nature, the more it is inclinable to it.

2 It is meanes to provoke charity.

3 It compares the evill fallen with the desert, and concludes the person unworthy to suffer it.

4 It brings us to acknowledge our owne misfortunes.

The parties most pitying are 5.

1 Old

1 Old men partly { As not being so stomackfull, as the young. / As having more experience of dangers.

2 Weaklings { Women / Children } { they thinke for their infirmity, they may soone suffer the like.

3 Schollers, as being by bookes acquainted with many examples of dangers.

4 They that have felt former evills, and now are rid of them.

5 They that have opinion of anothers worth, they count it below his deserts to be in evills.

The parties least pitying are 5.

1 Who are most given to { Anger. / Boldnesse. } { they recount not the evills, that may befall them.

2 Scoffers and they who are ready to wrong others.

3 They that are in extremity of distresse: As in Cities besieged, parents eate their owne children; whereas otherwise they used to pity them. Their care is for the remedy of their owne harmes, little for others: thence they that feare imminent dangers, pity not others, but care for themselves.

4 They that are in height of fortune not likely to fall. Thence tyrants and rich men pity least.

5 They that have prejudice against others behaviour, what befalls them, they count it desert, and doe lesse grieve at it.

The persons whom we pity most, are 4.

1 Acquaintance rather then strangers.

2 Our equalls either in { 1 Yeares. / 2 Manners. / 3 Profession. / 4 Office. / 5 Stocke.

3 They who suffer those evills, which we our selves feared.

4 Men bearing their harmes with { 1 Patience / 2 Courage } { by it we count them unworthy of them, and to pity them.

The way to raise pity for others.

1 Shew the valour, and the worth of the person that suffers.

2 The grievousnesse of the evills befallen.

3 The like may happen either to them, or their friends.

Conscience of a mans owne case moves it.

XX. *Of Zeale and Iealousie.*

1 ZEale is a Passion grounded on love.

It is mixt with { 1 Griefe for a fault committed. / 2 Desire for a good intended.

It borders on repentance, and is the issue and effect of it.

It is ever with fervency: It is most dangerous, unlesse it bee regulated with knowledge.

It is either for a { Good quality. / The good of a person.

1 The former is in the best, who are zealous of good for goodnesse it selfe.

2 The latter comes from the respect of a person conceived in the behalfe of one we love.

It supposeth { Wrong done to our friend / Desire of remedy } or griefe for it.

2 Iealousie is a passion conceiting an evill in another, that perhaps is guiltlesse of it: it comes onely by conjectures.

It proves often injurious

It

It breeds trouble in our selves, and distrust to our friends.

The way to barre it is, not to skanne the actions of others, but with a favourable interpretation.

XXI. *Of Anger.*

ANger is a compound of sundry passions: As 1. Pleasure in revenge. 2. Griefe in recounting the wrongs. 3. Insolence in overbearing. 4. Envy in repining at the welfare of others: The proper Act of it is desire of hurting.

The Tenents of it are 5.

1 A just iniury requires as just anger: and it is stupidity not to bee moved with it.

2 It is not bent against men in generall, but to some in speciall onely. Thence *Timon* is not said to be angry with all but hate all.

3 No passion is more indiscreet then it: thence it is ridiculous, and to be contemned, none more violent, thence terrible, and to be feared.

4 Being moderate it whets Valour; but over-earnest it weakens revenge.

5 To bee suddainly moved is a signe of weakenesse: hence it agrees more to the sicke, then the sound, to old folkes then to young; and to Women.

——— Quippe minuti
Semper & infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas
Ultio contenno, sic collige, Quod vindicta
Nemo magis gaudet quam femina.———

Adjuncts of anger are these, *viz.* 1 Vexation of minde. 2 Ignorance of his owne strength. 3 Undecency of gesture. 4 Wrongfull opinion of others.

The causes raising it are Generall. Speciall.

1 The generall disrespect shewed 4. wayes. 1 By derision in words. 2 Injury in deeds, as against, Body. Goods. Name. 3 Ingratitude for good turnes. 4 Want of due observance from our 1 Friends. 2 Inferiours either in 1 Blood. 2 Authority. 3 Wealth. 4 Vertue.

2 The speciall are according to the nature of speciall persons.

1 If wee have too setled a perswasion of those wee converse with, if they faile in the contrary to our expectation, our choler riseth: Hence credulity inflames anger.

2 Curiosity inflames it, if we busie our selves too much in love, and frivolous matters: Crosses in either of them fret us.

3 If wee delight in one thing more then another, when we should use either with indifferency: As in an houshold, if our stuffe of this fashion like us better then that, and we take pleasure in it, the losse or the mislaying of it frets us.

The wayes to allay anger in others.

1 Prove the wrong done upon Ignorance. Constraint. Suddaine passion. Mischance.

2 That it was done to our owne harme, as well as his.

3 Shew sorrow for it, for outfacing growes of impudency, that of disrespect, the nurse of anger.

4 Be not opposite in talke.
5 Dissemble our humility, and feare: the angred by this are lesse prone to revenge.
6 Seeme to bee serious for his good, and overcome this wrong with other passages of kindnesse.
7 Speake not against men of his sort and quality though their persons grieve him not.
8 Scoffe at none whatsoever, but be affable to all. *Isocrates ad Demon.*

To beare anger in our selves the wayes are 4.

1 Use no heart griefe, but { Sports. Games. Merriments. } Yet barre insolent delights, sith these are overbearing, and anger others.
2 Resolve to resist choler by not easily accepting disrespects.
3 A suddaine feare, or griefe unexpected allayeth ones anger.
4 If a wrong bee offered, rather contemne the offerer as wanting wit, then thinke our selves disgraced by it.

How to behave our selves in anger. 3.

1 Bend our selves to a contrary passion; as *Socrates* with his friend laboured to looke most pleasantly on him.
2 Retire we our selves from Company till the passion hath spent it selfe.
3 Not to revenge before our anger be past.

Persons most given to anger are 4.

1 Weaklings, as children, women, sicke men, old folkes.
2 They, that are ambitious, and standing for offices.
3 They, that require much awe and reverence of others.
4 They, that know their deserts well, yet are scorned.

The parties, with whom we are least angry.

1 They, who reverence us, which argues they doe not disrespect us.
2 We cannot be angry with him, whom we feare; sith anger implies hope of revenge: feare, not.
3 Men doing things upon choler, lesse anger us.
4 Anger cannot bee against those, whom we cannot hurt, as gods, and kings, that are out of our reach.

Satis de Ira.

XXII. *Of Maligning.*

THis Passion hath 2. parts, { 1 Envy, grieving at anothers good. 2 Ἐπιχαιρεκακία, joying for anothers evill.

1 It is in the worst natures, and is opposite to common society.

It is principally betwixt equalls, as men of the same sort: hence wee envy not those, that are in eminency above us: A common Souldier never envies *Alexander*; one of his neerest Captaines may.

3 It aimes especially at the goods of { Honour. Fortune.
4 It eates up a mans heart by fretting at others.
5 It ariseth from pride of our owne deserts.

The way to avoid it in our selves is to thinke that there must not bee an equality of gifts and goods in all: that as men are diverse, so they must have distinction of place; and if any excell, we ought not to repine.

Great men avoid the envy of others 3. wayes.

1 Let them shew themselves gentle, and affable to all.
2 Imploy their goods to the uses of others.

3 They must not thinke to bee singular in any thing, sith that is envious. *Nemo de nobis unus excellat*, This is the Law of the *Ephesians*, who therefore banished *Hermadorus*.

XXIII. *The efficient cause of Vertue.*

Vertue is effected by 3. things, { 1 Nature. 2 Precept. 3 Practise.

Nature begins the inclination: Precept directs it; Practise perfecteth it.

Nature workes vertue either from the { Soule onely. Temperature of the body.

In Soule are 2. parts, { Understanding. Will.

The understanding is either, *viz.* { 1 Speculative, working for contemplation: The issue of this is Sapience or pondering. 2 Practicke, working for action: The issue of it is Honesty, or morall Vertue.

1 The acts proper to the practicke Vnderstanding are 3. { 1 Conscience. 2 Consultation. 3 Prudence.

These judge things to be { Good. Evill.

Then the Will records them, { 1 For affecting it, if it be good. 2 For avoiding it, if it be evill.

Of Practicke Understanding.

As the speculative is the discerner of truth from falsehood: So the practicke of good from evill: Both judge from principles, and undoubted opinions: The practicke judges onely of morall principles arising out of the law of nature: Grounds, that *Atheists* assent unto in the generall; though they will not follow them in particular.

The principles of these are.

1 Honour God.
2 Love honesty.
3 Obey { Parents. Magistrates.
4 Love our Countrey.
5 Hurt no man, but doe as you would be done by.
6 Yeeld every man his owne.
7 Use all sociably, and in friendship, as farre as stands with our { Credit. Benefit
8 Execute common malefactours. for the common quiets sake.
9 Suffer distinction of Lordships, lands, bounds, mens private possessions, &c.

These rules all nations assent unto, and from these institute their Commonweales, *Ius gentium*. The breach of these is accusable by nature, and this accusation is termed Conscience.

XXIV. *Of Conscience.*

Conscience is the immediate act of our soule, arising from a naturall apprehension of good, and avoydance of evill:
It cannot be totally extinguished in any.

It

It brings us { To know our faults. / To condemne them. / To have will to prosecute the contrary.

It is either of { faults past; so it { Checks. / Condemnes. / future, so it retaines.

It is best in the meane, and most dangerous, when it is too { Large. / Nice.

1 The former calls evill good, and breeds presumption.
2 The latter counts of the best good as evill, and breeds despaire.

It grounds upon this Syllogisme.

No evill is to be committed:
This particular is evill.
Ergo: Not to be committed.

The Major is drawen from the practick understanding out of the rules of Nature. The Minor ariseth from view of particulars, which are variable, and may often deceive; if our apprehension of them be false, our Conscience must needs erre.

Error of conscience proceeds from these heads.

1 From ignorance, if we know not what is to be { Chosen. / Refused.
2 Negligence in not fitting our selves, and getting direction from others, if we finde our owne weake.
3 Pride in not humbling our conceits to others, that are { Wiser / Honester } then us.
4 Singularity in following our owne private spirit.
5 Passion, that inclines Conscience to follow appetite.
Perit omne judicium, cum res transit in affectum.
6 Pusillanimity in distrusting all things, and fearing to venture on any thing, lest we offend: If we doe any thing against conscience, bee it good or bad; the act utterly is sinfull.

XXV. *Of Consultation.*

COnsultation is grounded on these rules.

1 It is not touching the End, but of the meanes directing to it.
2 Things past are not to be consulted of, but things future.
3 Not necessary things, but contingent.
4 Things nothing appertaining to us are not to be consulted of.

Our consultation is either { By our selves alone. / By others.

1 Wee consult with our selves if the matter be { 1 Of a great secrecie. / 2 Suddainly befallen. / 3 If we have not a friend to impart it.
2 To consult with others observe them to be { Honest. / Wise. / Faithfull.

The question in our consultation is,

1 Whether the thing be convenient for vs.
2 Whether possibly to be compassed.

1 It is judged convenient if it be, *viz.* { 1 Safe for us, not discommodious. / 2 Not against the 4. rules of Honesty. { Prudence. / Justice. / Temperance. / Fortitude.

2 Possibility of compassing it found out from view of all these meanes, wee must use in working that end.

The particular wayes of Consultation are.

1 Whether the things be profitable, or disprofitable.
2 Whether honest, or dishonest.
3 When 2. profits are proposed, we question, which is greatest.
4 If 2. things be honest, which is most honest.
5 When one part is onely honest, the other onely profitable, which is rather to be prosecuted.

In Morality, the least honesty countervailes the most profit and is to be preferred before it: In Politicks our perswasion must be according to the auditory, with whom we deliberate.

Before the Vulgar our consultation must bee most inclining to profit, sith they are most addicted that way; before the better sort stand rather for honesty and honour.

XXVI. *Of Prudence.*

PRudence is a speciall quality of a Moralist, being the sole directresse, and governesse of all his actions.

It is onely in things ambiguous, and borders on Consultation.

It consists in { Choice. / Judgement. / Fitnesse of application.

It long consulteth, and quickly executeth.

It corrects things past, directs the present, foresees the future.

The speciall rule of it, is silence in revealing our purpose.

The waies to get it are.

1 Industry in { Disputing / Reading } matters practicke.
2 Observations of mens carriages.
3 Noting what effects proceed out of what causes.
4 Acquaintance with sundry Positive lawes, especially of our owne land.
5 Using to invent much of our owne, not to stand strictly on authority of others.

The parts requisite to prudence are:

1 Memory for retaining experiences past.
2 Understanding for judging morall principles.

This gotten by { Hearing. / Inventing our selves.

3 That wee may bee ready to heare is required docility, or readinesse to learne.
4 For invention is required, *Solertia*, a ripenesse of finding out meanes.
5 When we have { Learned, / Experienced, / Invented, } we must confer one thing with another, and discourse of the convenience of it. Hence to prudence is required reasoning.

Ratio.

6 Out of this discourse arise precepts for action.

These observe 3. things.

1 Direction for fit meanes to fit Ends. Hence is required Providence.
2 Weighing each circumstance of the businesse: Hence circumspection is required.
3 Avoiding all stops, and impediments: Hence is required caution for evill.

XXVII. *of the Will.*

THe seat of the Will is the Heart, where Passions reside: As the braine is the seate of the Understanding.

The will prosecutes what the understanding judges.

The object of it is Good: Of the understanding Truth.

Will without passion chooseth the true good: with passion the forged and apparent onely.

If goods bee evident, it affects simply without pause; if doubted, there is first deliberation.

It hath 2. parts, *viz.* { 1 Approbation, or willing. 2 Refusall, or nilling.

For execution it commands in men { Passions. Faculty of motions.

1 The former it rules by perswasion, as by an Aristocracy, or state regiment, whereby governement is not so absolute, but the rest may interpose.

2 The latter it rules by command, as a Lord over his servant, without relent in the one, or reluctance in the other.

The tenents of the Will are 2.

1 It affects nothing, but what the understanding hath weighed first: and contrarily the understanding conceits nothing, but the will perswades; their offices are joint and mutuall.

2 It cannot be constrained being of greatest freedome and liberty: Though wee have not freedome of will, to come from worse to better, in matters of grace, yet in matters civill wee have, sith it comes from a common notion of goodnesse conceived by the practick understanding.

XXVIII. *The formal causes of Vertue.*

TO examine this we enquire what is the { 1 Nature. 2 Properties. 3 Severall kindes of Vertues.

1 Its nature is to moderate the passionate part of the Soule: It is tearmed by *Plutarch*, A disposition of the understanding part, according to reason.

This reason either { 1 Rules the passionate part, so tearmed vertue. 2 Yeelds unto it, so it nurces up vice.

Aristotle defines it thus:

1 It is not connaturall, but bred by custome, thence termed Habit. Defin. Habitus.

2 Of habits some { 1 Inforcive as the understanding, that compels us to assent unto an evident truth. 2 On choice, and prælection, and such a one Vertue is.

3 Prælection and choice may be of things utterly nought; as when 2. evils stand compared, and in competition: but the choice of vertue must rely on the meane for his Center; whereas evills spread to the extreames, and multiply degrees: Goodnesse acknowledges one onely point of perfection, The golden mediocrity. Prælectivus.

Mediocrity changes according to circumstance of { 1 Time. 2 Place. 3 Person. } If it were set, and definitive one. In medio consisten.

It were vertue for all to use it alike, but the begger may not be liberall of his purse, though a King may; And *Milo* the wrastler may eate large meales, when the

the weakling taking the same proportion may be termed riotous: The foode of a man to a man is wholesome, but to a Serpent death: and what is venemous to one, may prove a vice to another. This mediocrity is to bee ruled by judgement of each circumstance, which prudence must prescribe.

Directions how we shall attaine the meane.

1 Of the 2. extreames see which is most opposite to vertue, and avoid it.

2 Sift out the vice, our nature is most prone to, and labour to avoid it, by taking the other extreame: As a man being given to be prodigall let him labour to bee covetous. *Ab extremo ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium.* So wee straighten sticks by bending them as much the contrary way, as they are bent the other way.

3 Resolve to resist bodily pleasures, and embrace them of the minde.

2. The properties, and notes of vertue.

1 No morall vertue, but is placed betweene two vices. { 1 The excesse to be depressed. 2 Defect to be raised.

2 Its ever in action, and the action must be with 3, conditions. { 1 Knowledge. *Scienter.* 2 Perseverance. *Constanter.* 3 Willingnesse. *Volenter.*

3 Delight in goodnesse is a signe of the vertue gotten.
Sorrow argues, we doe it unwillingly.

4 Vertue is conversant especially about the moderating of { Griefs. Pleasure. } sith these are the grounds and ends of all the rest.

5 It is exercised about the highest, and hardest imployments.

6 It is amiable to all men, even to strangers and enemies,

The grounds of vertue are 3. { 1 Religion towards God. 2 Charity to our neighbours. 3 Cherishing our selves according to reason.

The comprehension of all vertue is universall Justice: by it we yeeld our duty to { God. Neighbours. Our selves.

XXIX. *The severall kindes of Vertues.*

Vertues are either { 1 Common to all. 2 Speciall to some person.

1 The common are requisite to all, though perhaps few have them.

They are either { 1 Proper, or full vertues. 2 Improper, or halfe vertues.

1 Full vertues are directed either, { 1 To our private good onely. 2 To the good of others.

1 Our private good is gotten by the governance of 2. passions, { 1 Desire. 2 Feare.

1 Our desire is of things { Naturall. Adventitious.

1 Naturall { Of nourishment: The vertue that tempers this is Sobriety. Of venery: The vertue that allaies this is Chastity.

The conjoyning of both is called Temperance.

2 Goods adventitious, as of { Wealth: the vertue for this, is content. Honour; the vertue for this, modestie, or a decent competition, of what we deserve.

2 Our feare is allaied by Fortitude.

2. Vertues directed to the good of others are:

1 Justice

1 Justice of { Exchange. / Distribution.

2 Bestowing of gifts for the { Great ones, termed Magnificence. / Smaller sort, Liberality.

3 Courtesie, and pleasantnesse of conversation.

2 The halfe and imperfect vertues are { 1 Veracitie, or a habit of telling truth. / 2 Grace of carriage. / 3 Emulation. / 4 Continence. / 5 Patience.

2 The vertue speciall to some persons is the Heroicall spirit, which cannot be incident to all, but onely to the highest, and best perfections.

XXX. *Of Temperance.*

THis containes { 1 Sobriety touching { Meats, / Drinks, } both these have their { 1 Properties. / 2 Effects. / 2 Chastity, tamer of lusts.

The properties of Temperance.

1 With moderation to desire absent delights, and to use them present honestly.

2 To affect onely such as are lawfull, and honest.

3 For attaining, or injoying them to doe nothing, that may prejudice { 1 Health. / 2 Credit. / 3 Private estate.

The effects of Temperance { 1 Soundnesse of body. / 2 Strength of understanding. / 3 Promptnesse of both, acquiring and exercising all other vertues.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Intemperance, that unbridles our appecites, and gives the onset to all kind of vice.	Temperance.	Stupidity, the utter refusall of all naturall necessary delights; a fault so seldom, that the Ancients could invent no name for it.

Aut Deus est, aut Truncus iners, qui nescit amare.

Excesse.	Sobriety.	Defect.
In { Meates, gluttony. / Drinks, drunkennesse.	Meane.	Overmuch abstinence from necessary { Meats. / Drinks.

Castitas { 1 *Cœlibatus*, / 2 *Conjugii*.

Of Chastity.

Chastity is the containing of bodily lusts to the unmarried: moderating of them to the married.

It is in { Mind. / Body.

The breach of it is not from the act onely, but from the thought and affection of defiling.

The Integrity of mind and body is termed Virginity, the queene of Vertues. If wee abstaine in body but with reluctance of mind, it is termed Containing. A vertue Civill, sith law cannot take hold of us, but not full Morall.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Unchastity in { 1 Words. / 2 Gesture. / 3 Actions. / 4 Thoughts.	Chastity.	1 Defrauding our bodies of pleasures lawfull: This is vicious. / 2 In none, but the married, which must not defraud one another.

It

It effecteth 3. things, { 1 Diseases to the body. 2 Deformities. 3 Corruption to the mind.

XXXI. *Of Content.*

THis Vertue moderates the desire of wealth.

There are 2. parts of it { 1 A gratefull acceptance of our present estate. 2 Barring desires of more, then befits our use.

The properties of it are 5.

1 It breeds quietnesse, and tranquillity of mind.
2 It cannot be incident to fooles and ambitious men.
3 It is a token of a good nature, and wise discretion to know sufficiency.
4 It is the truest riches; whereas the injoying of the greatest possessions with desire to get more, is the truest poverty.
5 It ventures not wealth in rash mispending, but keepes what is gotten without feare, till occasion, and use force him to spend.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Covetousnesse, whose effects are 2. 1 A desire of gaine. 2 It perswades us to all vice for the attaining it.	Ἀυτάρκεια	Neglect of our state temporall. The effects hereof are 2. 1 Idlenesse in our vocation. 2 Extremity of want.

XXXII. *Modesty, and Magnanimity.*

BOth these are conversant about honour: The ground of them is desert.

Their properties 3.

1 To sue for honour deserved
2 To accept it offered.
3 To stand for his place, when his honour is deservedly yeelded to him.

Their difference.

Modesty is of lower, and lesse honour, as our desert is lower, and of lesse things.

Magnanimity is for the most generous heart, to desire the best, as his vertue is in supereminency above others.

Modesty hath these rules.

1 It argues, that both our selves and others have fit approbation of our vertue.
2 It is resolute against carpers, and wrongfull imputers.
3 It is humble in not acquiring further, then shall benefit us.
4 It shewes it selfe in { Words. Gestures. } either for the { Wishing what we deserve. Refusall of what we deserve not.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Ambition hatched by presumption.	Modesty.	Over-servileness called ἀνανδρία. It ariseth from ignorance of our owne worth, not daring to shew our selves in the world.

XXXIII. *Of*

XXXIII. *Of Magnanimity.*

MAgnanimity is for the highest perfection. It aimes at the best honour, so (whereas Honour is the repute of the multitude) the perfection of it is greatest, when that repute is most transcendent and generall. Thence the person truely magnanimous must have the whole fardle of vertues, that hee may benefit all, that speake well of him, and hurt none to avoid Ignominy.

The Adjunct of Magnanimity must be the highest place and office.

The Rules are 8.

1 The person having it counteth his honour receiv ed due unto him both for others good, and his owne desert.
2 He cares not for common censures.
3 He rather gives then takes rewards.
4 He remembers not injuries.
5 He is pliable to all sorts of persons, with satisfaction to them, and credit to himselfe.
6 He admires not others { Words, } sith he him- { Pleasure } is able to doe
{ Deeds, } selfe on { Occasion } the like.
7 He is sparing in censuring others, yet living.
8 He puts not himselfe upon voluntary dangers, yet undergoes the utmost, if it be put on him.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Pride.	Magnanimity.	Pusillanimity, or unfit dejection called μικροψυχία.

Pride is in { 1 Vaunting our owne parts. / 2 Suffering others to attribute more to us then we deserve.

It ariseth from philauty.

It betrayes it selfe in { Words. / Gesture. / Apparell.

It hath these tenents. 5.

1 A proud man admireth none but himselfe.
2 The way to abate him is to let him know, that we scorne him.
3 He is unjust, as attributing all to himselfe, and derogating from others.
4 It is most inclining, and most dangerous in falling.
5 It is hatefull in all, but detestable in poore folke.

Pusillanimity doth undervalue our worth.

The rules of it are 4.

1 It is ingratitude towards God to receive gifts, and by our reservednesse to lessen them.
2 It makes other jealous of our parts, when we our selves distrust them.
3 It is the mother of idlenesse.
4 It defrands other, that may get by us.

XXXIV. *Of Fortitude.*

THe Passions that exercise this vertue are { 1 Care to be raised. / 2 Boldnesse to be represled.

It is the indurance of evill for { Honour } sake. / { Honesty }

Evills

Evills are { Internall from our selves, as vices. / Externall, as dangers falling from without us.

1 The internall the most valiant ought to dread: his feare must be to nothing but sinne.

2 The externall are { 1 Extraordinary as { Prodigies. / Strange { Lightnings, Thunders, &c. } from God. } 2 Ordinary, and befalling in common.

1 The former none contemne, but { Atheists. / Fooles. / Madmen.

2 The valiant mans vertue is onely in contemning the latter.

2. Evils ordinary are { 1 Generall to all, as, Death, &c. / 2 Especiall to some as, { Exile. / Diseases. / Misfortunes.

Death is the principall object of Fortitude, sith its the most terrible of all other evills.

1 As barring us from the exercise of all morall vertues: the upshot of all goods.

2 As bereaving us of all temporall commodities, the objects of our delights in this world.

All death is not properly the object of Fortitude, but the most honourable, as dying in warre.

1 *Sith it is with highest honour.*

2 With most good to the publicke wealth.

The effects of Fortitude are 3.

1 To triumph over our enemies.

2 To keepe our owne state quiet from the wrong of others.

3 To assure us in extremities.

——— *Aut cita mors venit, aut victoria læta.*

The incouragements of this vertue are 5.

1 Words of cheering from the honourable and wiser sort.

2 Examples of others shewing their words by their deeds.

3 Exercise in skirmish.

4 Hope of reward, if not of spoile, yet of glory.

5 The enemies weaknesse, and unprovision.

The Tenents of Fortitude are 3.

1 The danger that it undergoes must have 3. conditions. { 1 They must bee honourably undertaken; not on suddaine Passion, or resolution. / 2 They must be in shew, that they may be commended by the weale publicke. / 3 They must not bee for private respects, but for publicke.

2 The valourous must not be stockish but have some feeling of wounds, yet voluntary he endures them for his ends sake.

3 It is not lawfull for him to kill himselfe, sith hee doth it for avoidance of further evill, which is cowardize, *nam*

———*Timidis est optare necem, Ovid. metam.*

Fiue sorts of men seeme to have Fortitude, yet have not.

1 They that undergoe dangers onely { on hope of reward, / for feare of punishment. } As pressed Souldiers.

2 They that warre onely, because they have had experience in the warre, and cannot shew their skill otherwise.

3 They that run to skirmish in hot blood.

4 They that overcame often, and for hope of like successe venture more.

5 They

5 They that weigh not the extent of the danger, they are soone resolute.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Rashnesse of venturing. This grounds most on the passion of boldnesse.	Fortitude.	Cowardize. This grounds most on the passion of feare.

XXXV. *Of Iustice.*

IUstice is the mother, and foundresse of other Vertues: It is in every constitution of state, { Publike. Private.

It is grounded in proportion and valuing.

It is either { Universall, comprehending all Vertues. Particular. for some especiall { State. Person.

1 Universall 2. parts, { Discretion to yeeld each his due. Obedience to the Law.

The lawes are either { Written, ἐγγραφα. Unwritten. ἄγραφα.

1 The written are the positive lawes of the land, grounded on the { Law of { Nature. Nations. Customes of places.

And they are { Publicke. Privare.

1 Publicke, { Endited by the whole state, as Statutes. Proceeding from the King alone, as Edicts, and Proclamations.

2 Private is for speciall contract, as Leases, Bonds, Deeds, and all which have force of law.

2 The not-written is the law of { Nature. Nations.

The precepts of this Justice are, *viz.* { 1 Live honestly. 2 Wrong none. 3 Yeeld every man his right.

2 Particular Justice is { Distributive designing to each man { Office. Rewards. Punishments. } according to desert. 2 Commutative in matter of exchange, and bargaine betweene man and man.

The breach of the { Former is favour, an acceptation of persons, προσωποληψία. Latter, deceipt.

Foure things prevent both kinds of Justice. { 1 Love of money. 2 Favour to the person. 3 Feare to displease great ones. 4 Rancor, and malice.

Justice of distribution considers 2. things: { Reward for the person deserving. Punishment for the person offending.

The objects of it are either { Honour Reward } to the good. Chastening to the bad.

Its Tenent is.

It is not positive but varies according to the quality of the person: As in any Army all must have their pay, but the Captaine more then the common Souldier:

Souldier: And it were injustice to make them equall in reward, that are unequall in desert. The like in punishments.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Injustice in dispensing to us above our desert.	Justice.	Injustice in yeelding us lesse then our desert.

Both are tearmed Injury.

The excesse is injury to others, and robbing them of their due, and bestowing on us that deserve it not.

The defect is injury to our selves, sith others can have, and we not.

The Rule of injury is:

1 That it is suffered still with repining and unwillingnesse: thence a man cannot doe himselfe injury, sith as he receives the wrong, hee is repining and as he offers it, hee is voluntary: And wee cannot will and nill at one time the same thing.

Justice of Exchange respecteth not the quality of the person but the worth of the thing: It is principally in buying and selling, and in all matters of contract.

This differs from the other, for this goes upon quality (so much for so much) that not: They are in trades, this in Merchandize, the meane is money.

In ancient time they used to give wares for wares: afterwards they gave Metals by weight for them. Now for more convenience of portage they have invented money, to wit, Metall in stampe and by it they exchange commodities.

The extreame in generall is unjust exchange.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
When we sell for more then its worth.	Justice commutative.	When wee sell for lesse then it is worth.

In the former wee wrong the buyer, and it is the greater fault: in the latter wee wrong our selves, and it is more tolerable, sith our selves are the cause of it.

The meane rule for this injustice is.

1 Hee is more in fault, that doth the wrong, then hee that takes it, It was *Socrates* his saying. *Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 2 c. 9.*

XXXVI. *Of Liberality, and Magnificence.*

THe act of this Vertue is relieving others wants, without prejudice to our owne.

Their difference is { Liberality is for lesse gifts. / Magnificence is for greater.

The object of both is money, or money-worth.

Liberality is of lower abilities.

In it are considered 2. conditions, { End / Manner } of giving.

The end onely is to benefit others in honest sort.

They that give { 1 To receive { Like / Greater } profit } are not counted liberall. / 2 Upon ostentation: / 3 On long importuning and suit: }

The manner of giving is bounded by circumstances, { 1 Who the { Giver / Receiver } is. / 2 The time that the gift ought to come. / 3 The place where. / 4 The quality of it. / 5 The quantity of it.

1 The

1 The Person must be { Free-hearted to any. / Wise to bestow on the worthiest.

1 Though the receiver bee lead, yet, if hee be in poverty, his poverty makes him worthy of reliefe.

2 The time must be without pause. *Bis dat, qui cito dat.*

3 The place must be considered of { 1 If wee give onely for honesty sake, take a publicke place, that others may witnesse it, sith fame is the trumpet of Vertue. / 2 If for poverty and almes blow no trumpet; a place of most privacy makes the gift most acceptable, *Ubicunque est homo ibi beneficio locus est. Seneca.*

4 The quality must be such, that it be not to the hurt of the receiver: it must rather be for profit, then for pleasure.

5 The quantity with moderation betweene either, { Too much, / Too little,

drawen from consideration of the want of the receiver, present use of the giver, that by giving he not disfurnisheth himselfe for his owne imployments.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Prodigality in wasting a mans private estate.	Liberality.	Avarice, or Niggardize: this is willing to receive all, give nothing.

Avarice is worse then Prodigality.

1 It is further removed from liberality, whose act is in giving, sith the niggard gives nothing, and the prodigall gives too much.

2 The niggard defraudes both himselfe and others: The prodigall harmes himselfe onely, and benefits others.

Magnificence is a Vertue onely for great ones.

The Magnificent must be high above others in { 1 Blood. / 2 Office. / 3 Vertue.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Riotous misspending.	Magnificence.	Sordid parsimony; fearing to spend when { Honour / Necessity } require.
The { End of it ostentation. / Cause { 1 Folly. / 2 Neglect of our private estate. } }		

XXXVII. *Of Courtesie and Vrbanity.*

THis Vertue shewes it selfe in { Serious / Sporting } Conversation.

The Act of it is pleasure, and pliableneese of behaviour.

The end of it to { Please others. / Demerit their good opinion.

It hath 2. parts, { Easinesse of accesse. / Slowneese to take offence.

The sterne to guide it is Gravity, least our affability turne to lightneese.

It was said of *Cato Major: Erat in illo viro comitate condita gravitas.*

The rules of it are 3.

1 It is most honourable in high persons.

2 It is varied according to the circumstance of { Time. / Place. / Person.

3 It intends our { Owne honestie. / Anothers profit.

For courteſie in ſerious matters the extreames are:

Exceſſe.	Meane.	Defect.
1 Popularity in great ones.	Comitie.	Moroſity, as ſeeking neither to pleaſe any in honeſt cauſes, nor be diſpleaſed by any.
2 Soothing in the lower ranke.		

Affability in ſports is called { Taking / Giving } jeſts.
Urbanity for

Exceſſe.	Meane.	Defect.
Scurrility for abuſe	Urbanity.	Ruſticity, making not able to give, nor willing to take jeſts.

XXXVIII. *Of Grace of Carriage.*

This Vertue makes not a man { Reall for honeſty. / But complementall.

Its rules are { Generall / Speciall } for faſhion.

1. Generall. 7.

1 Goe cleanly in apparrell.
2 Keepe our body from loathſomneſſe.
3 Have a fit compoſure of { Geſture, ſpecially for { Head. / Hands. } / Gate, and all without affectation, and niceneſſe.
4 Have convenience of ſpeech for { Fitneſſe of words. / Diſcretion of reply. / Moderation of ſound; that it be not { Over-loud. / Affected. / Harſh. }
5 Barre inſolent { 1 Geſture. / 2 Shrickes in laughter: let not that bee often, but as occaſion is offered; and that not ſo much apprehended by us, as the company alſo.
6 Uſe due reverence to our betters, obſervance to ſtrangers, pleaſure to our Acquaintance, Courteſie to our inferiours.
7 Take meat and drinke mannerly.

Speciall rules are had from conſideration of each { Perſon. / Degree. / Quality.

Perſons differ in { 1 Sexe. / 2 Yeares. / 3 Manners. / 4 Fortune.

Towards all our carriage muſt be honeſt and pleaſing.

1 Honeſt pleaſure is made by { Speech. / Geſture.
1 Twixt difference of ſexe this behaviour is requiſite: women muſt be { Little ſpeakers: / Not forward for action.
Men muſt take up the talke.
Their talke muſt be ſerious of { Learning. / Not things ſorrowfull, but of mirth, and obvious paſſages.
Their geſture is learned by dancing.

2 Difference

2 Difference of yeares is either in, *sc.* { Youth. / Middle-Age. / Old-Age.

Wayes to be gracefull with young.

1 They are soone angry: { Word, / Deed, } to raise passion in them. Crosse them not in

2 Enquire not of his faults: If a friend, tell him in private; if a stranger, he scorneth thy rebuke.

3 Tell them of good hopes, and great adventures. Young men are credulous and confident: and if you perswade them to the hope of a good, they will love you for it.

4 Our speach must rather be of pleasure, then profit.

5 Be merry and jesting, and seeme to like of their company.

To be gracefull with old men 5. wayes.

1 Bee not resolute in Tenents discoursing with them: they are soone testy, if they bee croft, and love rather a young man doubtfull in controversies, then over-holding; sith they know the hardnesse of finding out a truth, and the earnestnesse of youth in holding a possible falshood.

2 They are suspitious, we may not grow in too fast with them, or force into their company.

3 Our speach must rather be of profit, then honesty, since they are generally covetous.

4 Shew reverence to age, not for fashion, but as spying some sparks of authority in their persons.

5 They are talkative, feed them with speach, but rather second them in their conceits, then to sift them from contradictions, take heed of often replies, they must rather be forced by question, then they proceed voluntarily.

To aske them questions, save onely of things necessary, and pertaining to themselves is against good manners.

The middle aged keepe an indifferent tenour betwixt both { Young. / Old.

Our way to be gracefull with them is to keepe the middle straine for { Honesty, which likes young men. / Profit, which likes old men.

Difference of manners is seene according to the difference of passions, and the way to behave our selves in such a case is from the observance of his { Passion. / Age. } which have beene formerly described.

Difference of fortune is seene in { Nobility of birth. / Height of office. / Riches.

Our behaviour to these must be { Yeelding in word, / Submission in body, / Assigning titles, } This is most honest for us. / Pleasing for them.

XXXIX. *Of Æmulation.*

ÆMulation stirs us up to Vertue, and heartens us to Imitation.

The object of it is a good quality in others, and attainable by us.

It is with griefe, that others have out-stript us, and with hope of over-taking them.

It differs from Envy, sith that is in the worst, this in the best natures: *Li-*

curgus in *Sparta*, commended it to youth, naming it the nurse of Vertues.

In it selfe it is profitable, { Hate.
but in excesse raises { Envy.

The parties most given to it are,

1 Young men, sith they are ever in rising.

2 They, who have equality of { Trades. Professions. Abilities.

As the *Roman* æmulates the Souldier, the *Athenian* the Scholler, the *Carthaginian* the Merchant, &c.

3 They, who count themselves of worth, and hope to attaine to as much perfection as another.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Indignation for anothers rising.	Æmulation.	Abjection of mind, as not weighing, whether we be out-strip or no.

XLI. *Of Continency.*

This is conversant about { Desires / Pleasures } especially of { Nourishment. Venery.

The difference betweene a continent and temperate man is: The temperate hath his passion of desire subdued within: The continent not without foile and reluctance; passion dwelling within like a dangerous Citizen; though stopt from rising, yet ever feared.

Hence Continency is not properly a vertue, sith passion is not brought to consent with reason; And Incontinence is not properly a Vice, sith it doth that fact, but in judgement condemnes it.

The Intemperate doth it, { Will is corrupted.
and approves it, sith his { Judgement is blinded.

The opposite of Continence is Incontinence:

The Incontinent before the act hath knowledge of what is right and fit to be done: in the act hee is carried by Passion, which blinds him that hee cannot apply that knowledge: After the act hee remembers the fault, and begins to repent.

He falls into this vice by { Headinesse, as not willing to forecast his danger / Infirmity, as not able to resist his Passion.

Fals from infirmity are lesse curable, then falls of headinesse, sith the one comes from a debility of nature; the other but from an heat of Passion.

XLI. *Of Patience.*

This differs from Fortitude, as Continence from Temperance: The act of it is bearing of harmes, but with griefe and trouble of minde.

Hence it is no perfect Vertue, sith vertue must be { With joy. Voluntary.

Excesse.	Meane.	Defect.
Stockish obduration: The *Spartans* used their children to it in beating them, yet not suffering them to lament.	Patience.	Impatience: A womanish yeelding to unavoydable evills.

XLII. *Of*

XLII. *Of the Heroicall Spirit.*

THis riseth a degree of Eminence above the rest.
It differs from other vertues as heate from warmth.

It extends it selfe to a 3. fold Eminence,
1 Of understanding: so the famous Lawgivers and speciall Sages are Heroicall.
2 Of Grace: so excellence of faith is Heroicall.
3 Of Morall behaviour.

It is grounded on a
Strong composure, and temperature of Body.
Strong composure of Mind.

It is set forth by 3. helps,
1 Many abilities for Action,
2 Constancy of Continuance.
3 Prosperousnesse of Successe.

The opposite of it is Savageneſſe: A generall falling from all good duty without judgement to know, or will to wish the contrary.

These are the Catalogues of Vertue. Vertue tempers Passion. Passion gets his meane from Wit, and Will: And these intend for their felicity.

Detur inoffensæ vitæ mihi tangere metam.

FINIS.

1 What Ethicks is.
2 Of the particular end of Ethicks.
3 Of universall ends thereof.
4 Temporall Happinesse.
5 Things required to Temporall Happinesse.
6 Stoicks Tenent of Happinesse.
7 Of Passions in generall.
8 The divisions and number of Passions.
9 Of Love the first passion.
10 Of Desire the second passion.
11 Of Hope the third passion.
12 Of Boldnesse the fourth passion.
13 Of pleasure the fifth passion.
14 Of Hate and detesting.
15 Of Despaire and Feare.
16 Of Griefe.
17 Of Shamefastnesse.
18 Of Repentance.
19 Of Pitie.
20 Of Zeale and Iealousie.
21 Of Anger.
22 Of Maligning.
23 The efficient cause of Vertue.
24 Of Conscience.
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27 Of the Will.
28 The formall causes of Vertue.
29 The Severall kindes of Vertue.
30 Of Temperance.
31 Of Content.
32 Of Modesty.
33 Of Magnanimity.
34 Of Fortitude.
35 Of Iustice.
36 Of Liberality and Magnificence.
37 Of Courtesie and Vrbanity.
38 Of the grace of Carriage.
39 Of Emulation.
40 Of Continency.
41 Of Patience.
42 Of the Heroicall spirit.

FINIS.